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Parameterized Analysis of Assignment Under
Multiple Preferences
Barak Steindl · Meirav Zehavi
Abstract The Assignment problem is a fundamental, well-studied problem
in the intersection of Social Choice, Computational Economics and Discrete
Allocation. In the Assignment problem, we seek a pareto optimal allocation of
items to agents given the preferences of the agents. We introduce a generalized
version of this problem, where each agent is equipped with multiple incomplete
preference lists: each list (called a layer) is a ranking of items in a possibly
different way according to a different criterion. We introduce a new concept of
pareto optimality, and study the generalized version of the problem from the
perspective of Parameterized Complexity. Here, we consider several natural
parameters such as the number of layers, number of agents, number of items,
and maximal length of a preference list; we present a comprehensive picture of
the parameterized complexity of the problem with respect to these parameters.
Keywords Parameterized Complexity · Computational Social Choice ·
Resource Allocation · Computational Economics
1 Introduction
The class of resource allocation problems has been widely studied in recent
years. A fundamental and one of the most well-studied problems in this field is
the Assignment problem [2,8,1,3,21,5,4,18,14]. In the Assignment prob-
lem we are given a set of n agents, and a set of m items. Each agent has strict
preferences over a subset of items, and the objective is to find an assignment
(namely, a matching of agents to items) that allocates the items to the agents
in an “optimal” way. Different notions of optimality have been considered in
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the literature, but one that has received the most attention is pareto optimal-
ity. Intuitively, an assignment p is called pareto optimal if there is no other
assignment q that is at least good as p for all agents and also strictly better
than p for at least one agent.
Besides its theoretical interest, the problem has also significant practical
importance. Algorithms for the Assignment problem have applications in
a variety of real-world situations, such as assigning jobs to workers, campus
houses to students, time stamps to users on a common machine, players to
sports teams, graduating medical students to their first hospital appointments,
and so on.
A simple and well-studied allocation mechanism is the greedy serial dic-
tatorship mechanism, introduced by Abdulkadiroglu and So¨nmez [2]. In the
serial dictatorship mechanism, we draw a random permutation on the agents
from the uniform distribution. The agent that is ordered first in the permuta-
tion is assigned to its top choice, the agent ordered second is assigned to its top
choice among the remaining items and so on. Abdulkadiroglu and So¨nmez [2]
proved that applying this mechanism results in a pareto optimal assignment.
In this paper, we consider an extension to the Assignment problem in
which the agents may have multiple preference lists (rather than only one). In
the classic Assignment problem, each agent has exactly one preference list.
The preference lists may represent a single subjective criterion according to
which each agent ranks the items. However, it may also represent a combina-
tion of different such criteria: each agent associates a score to each item per
criterion, and a single preference list is derived from some weighted sum of the
scores. In many cases, it is unclear how to combine scores associated with cri-
teria of inherently incomparable nature - that is like “comparing apples with
oranges”. Additionally, even if a single list can be forcefully extracted, most
data is lost. Thus, the classic model seems somewhat restrictive in real world
scenarios where people rely on highly varied aspects to rank other entities.
For example, suppose that there are n job candidates who need to be assigned
to n positions. The recruiters may rank the candidates for each position ac-
cording to different criteria, such as academic background, their experience in
each specific field, impression by the interview, and so on. This motivates the
employment of multiple preference lists where each preference list (called a
layer) is defined by a different criterion.
Our work is inspired by the work of Chen et al. [10], who studied the
Stable Marriage problem under multiple preferences. In contrast to the
Assignment problem, the Stable Marriage problem is a two-sided match-
ing problem, i.e. it consists of two disjoint sets of agents A and B, such that
each agent strictly ranks the agents of the opposite set (in the Assignment
problem, only the agents rank the items). The objective in the Stable Mar-
riage problem is to find a matching between A and B such that there do not
exist agents a ∈ A, b ∈ B which are not matched to each other but rank each
other higher than their matched partners (Irvin [17] extended this definition
to the case in which the preference lists may have ties).
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Chen et al. [10] considered an extension of the Stable Marriage problem
where there are ` layers of preferences. Thus, the definition of stability should
be changed accordingly; three notions of stability were defined: α-global sta-
bility, α-pair stability, and α-individual stability. In their work, Chen et al. [10]
studied the algorithmic complexity of finding matchings that satisfy each of
these stability notions. The notion of α-global stability extends the original one
in a straightforward and natural way by requiring a matching to be stable in
some α layers. Our notion of optimality for the extension of the Assignment
problem is very similar to this definition such that it requires an assignment
to be pareto optimal in some α layers.
In contrast to [10], our research focuses more on the aspect of parameterized
complexity. We take into account a variety of parameters ([10] focuses only on
the parameter α), and we provide parameterized algorithms, parameterized
hardness results, and ETH-based lower bounds regarding them ([10] focuses
only on parameterized hardness results). We also study the kernelization of
the problem: We provide 2 kernels, and lower bounds on kernel sizes.
Although the Assignment problem can be easily solved in polynomial
time using the serial dictatorship mechanism (Abdulkadiroglu and So¨nmez
[2]), the problem becomes harder when multiple preference lists are taken into
account.
The Assignment problem and the Stable Marriage problem. On first
sight, it may seem that the Assignment problem is a special case of the Sta-
ble Marriage problem with indifference [17] (the preferences of the agents
remain the same, and all the items rank all the agents equally). We men-
tion that it is a completely different problem since pareto optimality is not
equivalent to the stability notions defined by Irving [17] for the the Stable
Marriage problem with indifference. Suppose the following instance of the
Assignment problem with 3 agents a1, a2, a3, and 3 items b1, b2, b3:
• a1 : b1 > b2 > b3
• a2 : b3 > b2 > b1
• a3 : b3 > b1 > b2
We transfer this instance to an instance of Stable Marriage with indif-
ference by making all the items to rank a1, a2 and a3 equally as follows:
• a1 : b1 > b2 > b3 • b1 : a1 = a2 = a3
• a2 : b3 > b2 > b1 • b2 : a1 = a2 = a3
• a3 : b3 > b1 > b2 • b3 : a1 = a2 = a3
Suppose the matching p that satisfies p(ai) = bi for every i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Then, p is pareto optimal for the Assignment instance, but it is not strongly
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stable (see [17] for the definition) for the constructed Stable Marriage
instance since {a2, b3} is a blocking pair. Suppose the matching q that satisfies
q(a1) = b2, q(a2) = b1 and q(a3) = b3. Then, q is not pareto optimal for
the Assignment instance, but it is weakly stable and even super stable for
the Stable Marriage instance. Thus, we conclude that the problems are
different from each other.
1.1 Contributions and Methods
We consider several parameters such as the number of layers `, number of
agents, number of items, maximal length of a preference list d, and the given
number of layers α for which we require an assignment to be pareto opti-
mal; we present a comprehensive picture of the parameterized complexity of
the problem with respect to these parameters. Arguably, the choice of these
parameters is natural and sensible because in real-life scenarios as those men-
tioned above, some of these parameters may be substantially smaller than the
input size. A summary of our results is given in Table 1.
NP-Hardness. We first prove that the problem is NP-hard when 2 ≤ α ≤ `
by presenting a polynomial reduction from the Serial Dictatorship Fea-
sibility problem (defined in Section 3) that relies on a reduction by Aziz el
al. [5]. We also define three polynomial-time constructions of preference pro-
files given an instance of 3-SAT, and we rely on them in the construction of a
polynomial reduction from 3-SAT to the problem, such that in the resulting
instance α+ `+ d is bounded by a fixed constant. By this result, we conclude
that the problem is para-NP-hard for the parameter α+ `+ d.
Kernelization. We prove that the problem admits a polynomial kernel with
respect to the parameter #agents + `. Roughly speaking, for each agent,
the kernel keeps only the first #agents most preferred items that appear
in its preference lists. The resulting instance is equivalent due to a propo-
sition stating that each pareto optimal assignment must assign each agent
to an item that is ranked in some position j in its preference list where
j ≤ #agents. Furthermore, we prove that the problem is FPT with respect
to the parameter #items + ` by providing a double-exponential kernel. We
also prove that the problem does not admit polynomial kernels for the param-
eters #agents+#items+α, #agents+#items+(`−α), and #items+ ` using
three cross-compositions (defined in Section 2) from 3-SAT which rely on the
constructions of preference profiles defined in Section 3.
Fixed-Parameter Tractability and ETH Based Lower Bounds. We prove that
the problem is FPT with respect to the parameter n = #agents by providing
an O∗(n!) time algorithm. Informally speaking, the algorithm applies serial
dictatorship with respect to all possible permutations over the agents in each
layer until it finds an α-globally optimal assignment or declares that no such
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Parameter k Complexity Class Running Time Is There a Polynomial Kernel?
`+ α+ d para-NP-hard [T. 2] - -
#agents FPT O∗(n!)* [T. 7 + T. 8] no [T. 5]
#items XP, W[1]-hard [T. 11] (nm)O(m) [T. 10] -
#agents + α FPT O∗(n!)* [T. 7 + T. 8] no [T. 5]
#items + α XP, W[1]-hard [T. 11] (nm)O(m) [T. 10] -
#agents + #items + α FPT O∗(n!)* [T. 7 + T. 8] no [T. 5]
#agents + (`− α) FPT O∗(n!)* [T. 7 + T. 9] no [T. 5]
#items + (`− α) XP, W[1]-hard [T. 12] (nm)O(m) [T. 10] -
#agents + #items + (`− α) FPT O∗(n!)* [T. 7 + T. 9] no [T. 5]
#agents + ` FPT O∗(n!) [T. 7] yes [T. 3]
#items + ` FPT O∗(((m!)`+1)!) [C. 5.2] no [T. 6]
#agents + #items + ` FPT O∗(n!) [T. 7] yes [T. 3]
Table 1 Summary of our results. Results marked with * are proved to be optimal under
the ETH; n and m denote the number of agents and the number of items, respectively.
assignment exists. We then prove that O∗(2O(k log k)) is a tight lower bound
on the running time under ETH (defined in Section 2) for the parameters k =
#agents+#items+α and k = #agents+#items+(`−α) using linear parameter
reductions from the k × k Permutation Clique problem. That makes the
algorithm optimal under the ETH. We also prove that the problem is XP
with respect to the parameter m = #items by providing a mO(m) ·nO(m) time
algorithm (n denotes the number of agents). Lastly, we prove that the problem
is W[1]-hard with respect to the parameters #items +α and #items + (`−α)
using two parameterized reductions from Multicolored Independent Set.
2 Preliminaries
For any natural number t, we denote the set {1, . . . , t} by [t]. We use the O∗-
notation to suppress polynomial factors in the input size, that is, O∗(f(k))
means f(k) · nO(1).
The Assignment Problem. An instance of the Assignment problem is a triple
(A, I, P ) where A is a set of n agents {a1, . . . , an}, I is a set of m items
{b1, . . . , bm}, and P = (<a1 , . . . , <an), called the preference profile, contains
the preferences of the agents over the items, where each <ai encodes the pref-
erences of ai and is a linear order (i.e. antisymmetric, transitive, and connex)
over a subset of I (preferences are allowed to be incomplete). We refer to such
linear orders as preference lists. If bj <ai br, we say that agent ai prefers item
br over item bj , and we write bj ≤ai br if bj <ai br or bj = br. Item b is
acceptable by agent a if b appears in a’s preference list. An assignment is an
allocation of items to agents such that each agent is allocated at most one
item, and each item is allocated to at most one agent. Since the preferences
of the agents may be incomplete, or the number of items may be smaller than
the number of agents, some agents may not have available items to be assigned
to. In order to deal with this case, we define a special item b∅, which we see
as the least preferred item of each agent, and will be used as a sign that an
agent is not allocated an item. Through out this paper, we assume that b∅ is
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not part of the item sets, and that it appears at the end of every preference
list (we will not write b∅ explicitly in the preference lists). Formally, an assign-
ment p : A → I ∪ {b∅} is an allocation of items to agents, satisfying that for
each i ∈ [n]: (1) p(ai) = b∅, or (2) both p(ai) ∈ I and for each j ∈ [n] \ {i},
p(ai) 6= p(aj). We refer to p as legal if it satisfies p(ai) = b∅ or that p(ai) ∈ I
is acceptable by ai for each i ∈ [n]. For brevity, we will omit the term “legal”
and refer to a legal assignment just as an assignment. We will use it only when
we want to emphasize that some assignment is legal (or not legal).
Optimality. Informally speaking, an assignment p is pareto optimal if there
does not exist another assignment q that is “at least as good” as p for all the
agents, and is “better” for at least one agent. Formally, p is pareto optimal if
there does not exist another assignment q such that p(ai) ≤ai q(ai) for every
i ∈ [n], and there exists i ∈ [n] such that p(ai) <ai q(ai). If such an assignment
q exists, we say that q pareto dominates p.
We first give some well-known characterizations of pareto optimal assign-
ments that are useful for our research. Intuitively, an assignment admits a
trading cycle if there exists a set of agents who all benefit by exchanging their
allocated items among themselves. For example, a simple trading cycle among
two agents a and b occurs when agent a prefers agent b’s item over its own
item, and agent b prefers agent a’s item over its own item. Both a and b would
benefit from exchanging their items. Formally, a trading cycle is defined as
follows.
Definition 2.1. An assignment p admits a trading cycle
(ai0 , bj0 , ai1 , bj1 , . . . , aik−1 , bjk−1) if for each r ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}, we have
that p(air ) = bjr and bjr <air bjr+1 (mod k) .
Definition 2.2. An assignment p admits a self loop if there exist an agent ai
and an item bj such that bj is not allocated to any agent by p, and p(ai) <ai bj.
Proposition 2.3 (Folklore; see, e.g., Aziz et al. [5,4]). An assignment p is
pareto optimal if and only if it does not admit trading cycles and self loops.
By this proposition, the problem of checking whether an assignment admits
trading cycles or self loops can be reduced to the problem of checking whether
a directed graph contains cycles. For instance (A, I, P ) and assignment p, the
corresponding trading graph is the directed graph defined as follows. Its vertex
set is A ∪ I, and there are three types of edges:
• For each a ∈ A such that p(a) 6= b∅, there is a directed edge from p(a) to
a. Namely, each allocated item points to its owner.
• For each agent a ∈ A, there is an edge from a to all the items it prefers over
its assigned item p(a) (if p(a) = b∅, a points to all its acceptable items).
• Each item with no owner points to all the agents that accept it.
Proposition 2.4 (Folklore; see, e.g., Aziz et al. [5,4]). An assignment p is
pareto optimal if and only if its corresponding trading graph does not contain
cycles.
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A simple assignment mechanism is the greedy serial dictatorship mech-
anism. For a given permutation over the agents, the mechanism takes each
agent in turns, according to the permutation. The agent which is ordered first
allocates its most preferred item, the second allocates its most preferred item
among the remaining items, and so on. If at some point, an agent has no
available item to allocate in its preference list, it allocates b∅. We say that
an assignment p is a possible outcome of serial dictatorship if there exists a
permutation pi such that applying serial dictatorship with respect to pi results
in p.
Proposition 2.5 (Abdulkadiroglu and So¨nmez [2]). An assignment p is pareto
optimal if and only if it is a possible outcome of serial dictatorship.
Corollary 2.6. A pareto optimal assignment always exists and can be found in
polynomial time, and the number of pareto optimal assignments for an instance
with n agents is at most n!.
Proposition 2.5 yields a surjective mapping from the set of permutations
on the agents to the set of pareto optimal assignments. This implies an upper
bound of n! on the number of pareto optimal assignments. Observe that this
bound is tight: consider an instance where there is an equal number of agents
and items, and all the agents share the same complete preference list. Ob-
serve that each permutation gives us a unique assignment after applying serial
dictatorship with respect to it. Thus, there exist exactly n! pareto optimal
assignments.
Generalization of the Assignment Problem. We introduce a generalized version
of the Assignment problem where there are ` layers of preferences. For each
j ∈ [`], we refer to <(j)ai as ai’s preference list in layer j. The preference profile
in layer j is the collection of the agents’ preference lists in the layer, namely,
Pj = (<(j)a1 , . . . , <
(j)
an ). We say that assignment p is pareto optimal in layer j
if it is pareto optimal in the single-layered instance (A, I, Pj). To adapt the
notion of optimality to the new context, we introduce a natural generalization
requiring an assignment to be optimal in a given number of layers.
Definition 2.7. An assignment p is α-globally optimal for an instance
(A, I, P1, . . . , P`) if there exist α layers i1, . . . , iα ∈ [`] such that p is pareto
optimal in layer ij for each j ∈ [α].
Thus, the new problem is defined as follows.
Globally Optimal Assignment
Input: (A, I, P1, . . . , P`, α), where A is a set of n agents, I is a set of m
items, Pi is the preference profile in layer i for each i ∈ [`], and α ∈ [`].
Question: Does an α-globally optimal assignment exist?
Example. Consider the following instance, where the agent set is A =
{a1, a2, a3, a4}, the item set is I = {b1, b2, b3, b4}, and there are four layers,
defined as follows.
Layer 1:
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• a1 : b1
• a2 : b3 > b2 > b1
• a3 : b3 > b1
• a4 : b2 > b1 > b3
Layer 2:
• a1 : b2 > b1
• a2 : b2 > b3
• a3 : b1 > b2 > b3
• a4 : b3
Layer 3:
• a1 : b2 > b1
• a2 : b4 > b2 > b1
• a3 : b1 > b3
• a4 : b2 > b1 > b3
Layer 4:
• a1 : b3 > b1 > b2
• a2 : b1 > b2
• a3 : b2 > b3
• a4 : ∅
Consider an assignment p in which ai gets bi for every i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and
a4 gets b∅. The assignment is 2-globally optimal since it is pareto optimal in
the first two layers. To see this, apply serial dictatorship in the first layer with
respect to the permutation (a1, a3, a2, a4), and in the second layer with respect
to the permutation (a2, a1, a3, a4), and verify that p is the outcome of both
runs. In contrast, p is not pareto optimal in the third layer since it admits a self
loop among a2 and b4 (b4 is available and is preferred by a2 over its assigned
item b2). Furthermore, assignment p is not pareto optimal in the fourth layer
because it admits a trading cycle (a1, b1, a3, b3, a2, b2) (see Figure 1): if a1, a2
and a3 trade their items, we get a new assignment q in which a1 gets b3, a2
gets b1, and a3 gets b2; assignment q pareto dominates p in the fourth layer,
and we can verify that it is also pareto optimal in this layer.
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a1 a2 a3 a4
b1 b2 b3 b4
Fig. 1 The trading graph with respect to p in the fourth layer, where p admits the trading
cycle (a1, b1, a3, b3, a2, b2).
Parameterized Complexity. Let Π be an NP-hard problem. In the framework
of Parameterized Complexity, each instance of Π is associated with a param-
eter k. Here, the goal is to confine the combinatorial explosion in the running
time of an algorithm for Π to depend only on k. Formally, we say that Π is
fixed-parameter tractable (FPT) if any instance (I, k) of Π is solvable in time
f(k) · |I|O(1), where f is an arbitrary computable function of k. A weaker re-
quest is that for every fixed k, the problem Π would be solvable in polynomial
time. Formally, we say that Π is slice-wise polynomial (XP) if any instance
(I, k) of Π is solvable in time f(k) · |I|g(k), where f and g are arbitrary com-
putable functions of k. Nowadays, Parameterized Complexity supplies a rich
toolkit to design FPT and XP algorithms.
Parameterized Complexity also provides methods to show that a problem is
unlikely to be FPT. The main technique is the one of parameterized reductions
analogous to those employed in classical complexity. Here, the concept of W[1]-
hardness replaces the one of NP-hardness, and for reductions we need not only
construct an equivalent instance in FPT time, but also ensure that the size of
the parameter in the new instance depends only on the size of the parameter
in the original one.
Definition 2.8. (Parameterized Reduction) Let Π and Π ′ be two param-
eterized problems. A parameterized reduction from Π to Π ′ is an algorithm
that, given an instance (I, k) of Π, outputs an instance (I ′, k′) of Π ′ such that:
• (I, k) is a Yes-instance of Π if and only if (I ′, k′) is a Yes-instance of Π ′.
• k′ ≤ g(k) for some computable function g.
• The running time is f(k) · |Π|O(1) for some computable function f .
If there exists such a reduction transforming a problem known to be W[1]-
hard to another problem Π, then the problem Π is W[1]-hard as well. Central
W[1]-hard-problems include, for example, deciding whether a nondeterministic
single-tape Turing machine accepts within k steps, Clique parameterized be
solution size, and Independent Set parameterized by solution size. To show
that a problem Π is not XP unless P=NP, it is sufficient to show that there
exists a fixed k such Π is NP-hard. Then, the problem is said to be para-NP-
hard.
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A companion notion to that of fixed-parameter tractability is the one of
a polynomial kernel. Formally, a parameterized problem Π is said to admit a
polynomial compression if there exists a (not necessarily parameterized) prob-
lem Π ′ and a polynomial-time algorithm that given an instance (I, k) of Π,
outputs an equivalent instance I ′ of Π ′ (that is, (I, k) is a Yes-instance of
Π if and only if I ′ is a Yes-instance of Π ′) such that |I ′| ≤ p(k) where p is
some polynomial that depends only on k. In case Π ′ = Π, we further say
that Π admits a polynomial kernel. For more information on Parameterized
Complexity, we refer the reader to recent books such as [12,11,13].
Non-Existence of a Polynomial Compression. Our proof of the “unlikely exis-
tence” of a polynomial kernel for Globally Optimal Assignment relies on
the well-known notion of cross-composition, defined as follows.
Definition 2.9 (Cross-Composition). A (not parameterized) problem Π
cross-composes into a parameterized problem Π ′ if there exists a polynomial-
time algorithm, called a cross-composition, that given instances I1, I2, . . . , It
of Π for some t ∈ N that are of the same size s for some s ∈ N, outputs an
instance (I, k) of Π ′ such that the following conditions are satisfied.
• k ≤ p(s+ log t) for some polynomial p.
• (I, k) is a Yes-instance of Π ′ if and only if at least one of the instances
I1, I2, . . . , It is a Yes-instance of Π.
Proposition 2.10 ([6,7]). Let Π be an NP-hard (not parameterized) problem
that cross-composes into a parameterized problem Π ′. Then, Π ′ does not admit
a polynomial compression, unless NP⊆coNP/poly.
To obtain (essentially) tight conditional lower bounds for the running times
of algorithms, we rely on the well-known Exponential-Time Hypothesis (ETH)
[15,16,9]. To formalize the statement of ETH, first recall that given a formula
ϕ in conjuctive normal form (CNF) with n variables and m clauses, the task
of CNF-SAT is to decide whether there is a truth assignment to the variables
that satisfies ϕ. In the p-CNF-SAT problem, each clause is restricted to have
at most p literals. ETH asserts that 3-CNF-SAT cannot be solved in time
O(2o(n)).
3 NP Hardness
Theorem 1. For any 2 ≤ α ≤ `, Globally Optimal Assignment is NP-
hard.
Proof. We rely on a reduction made by Aziz et al. [5] from the Serial Dic-
tatorship Feasibility problem, which was proved to be NP-hard by Saban
and Sethuraman [20]. In the Serial Dictatorship Feasibility problem,
the input is a tuple (A, I, P, a, b) where A is a set of n agents, I is a set of n
items, P is the preference profile in which each agent has a complete linear
order on the items, a ∈ A, and b ∈ I. The task is to decide whether there
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exists a permutation for which serial dictatorship (defined in Section 2) allo-
cates item b to agent a. Given such (A, I, P, a, b), Aziz et al. [5] constructed
two preference profiles, P1 and P2, such that (A, I, P, a, b) is a Yes-instance if
and only if there exists an assignment that is pareto optimal in both P1 and
P2.
Let (A, I, P, a, b) be an instance of Serial Dictatorship Feasibility.
We construct the aforementioned preference profiles P1 and P2. We also add
additional `−α new items c1, . . . , c`−α, and define I ′ = I ∪{c1, . . . , c`−α}. We
construct `−α preference profiles P ′1, . . . , P ′`−α, where for each i ∈ [`−α], P ′i
is defined as follows:
• a : ci
• a′ : ∅ ∀a′ ∈ A \ {a}
In other words, the only item that agent a accepts in P ′i is ci, and for each
a′ ∈ A \ {a}, a′ accepts no items. We construct an instance of Globally
Optimal Assignment with the agent set A, and the item set I ′, consisting
of ` layers. The first two layers contain the preference profiles P1 and P2,
the next α − 2 layers contain copies of P1, and the next ` − α layers contain
P ′1, . . . , P
′
`−α. Let us first prove the following.
Claim 3.1. Let p be an α-globally optimal assignment for the constructed
instance. Then p is pareto optimal in P1 and P2.
Proof. Note that the only pareto optimal assignment for P ′i is the assignment
that allocates ci to a, and b∅ to each a′ ∈ A \ {a}. Hence, there does not exist
an assignment that is pareto optimal in both P ′i and P ′j when i 6= j. Moreover,
there does not exist an assignment that is pareto optimal in both P ′i and P1
or in both P ′i and P2 since ci is not acceptable by a in P1 as well as P2. The
only possible option is that p is pareto optimal in the first α layers, then we
have that p is pareto optimal in both P1 and P2. ♦
We claim that there exists an α-globally optimal assignment for the con-
structed instance if and only if (A, I, P, a, b) is a Yes-instance.
(⇒): Suppose there exists an α-globally optimal assignment p for the con-
structed instance. By Claim 3.1, p is pareto optimal in both P1 and P2. By
Aziz et al. [5], this implies that (A, I, P, a, b) is a Yes-instance.
(⇐): Assume that (A, I, P, a, b) is a Yes-instance. By Aziz et al. [5], there
exists an assignment p that is pareto optimal in both P1 and P2. By the
construction of the instance, p is pareto optimal in the first α layers, hence p
is α-globally optimal for the constructed instance.
Corollary 3.2. Globally Optimal Assignment is para-NP-hard for the
parameter `+ α.
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In contrast to Theorem 1, we mention that it is impossible to obtain the
same hardness result when α = 1.
Observation 3.3. Globally Optimal Assignment is solvable in a poly-
nomial time when α = 1.
Proof. We can simply find a pareto optimal assignment for the first layer using
Corollary 2.6.
Before we continue with our next results, let us discuss a simple property
that will help in many of our proofs.
Definition 3.4. Let (A, I, P ) be an instance of the Assignment problem and
suppose that P = {<a| a ∈ A}. We say that agents a1, a2 ∈ A respect each
other if there exists a linear order on a subset of I,C ⊆ I× I, such that both
<a1⊆C and <a2⊆C.
Lemma 3.5. Let (A, I, P ) be an instance of the Assignment problem, such
that there exist some agents a1, . . . , ar ∈ A such that for each i, j ∈ [r], ai and
aj respect each other. Then, for every assignment p : A→ I ∪{b∅}, p does not
admit a trading cycle among the agents a1, . . . , ar.
Proof. Towards a contradiction, suppose there exist an assignment p which
admits a trading cycle (a1, p(a1), . . . , ar, p(ar)) (notice that r ≥ 2).
Since a1, . . . , ar pairwise respect each other, there exists a linear orderC ⊆ I × I, such that for each i ∈ [r], <ai⊆ C. This implies
that p(a1)Cp(a2)C . . .Cp(ar). Since p(ar) <ar p(a1), we have that
p(ar)Cp(a1), a contradiction toC being a linear order.
We define three constructions of preference profiles given an instance of 3-
SAT and we prove interesting properties regarding them. We will rely on these
in the design of a polynomial reduction from 3-SAT to Globally Optimal
Assignment that shows that Globally Optimal Assignment is para-NP-
hard with respect to the parameter `+α+d (where d is the maximal length of
a preference list). We will also rely on these results in the design of our cross-
compositions, which prove that Globally Optimal Assignment does not
admit a polynomial kernel with respect to the parameters #agents+#items+
α, #agents + #items + (`− α), and #items + ` unless NP⊆coNP/poly.
Let n,m ∈ N be positive integers. We use the notation A(m,n) to refer
to the agent set A(m,n) = {ai,j | i ∈ [m], j ∈ [n]} ∪ {ai,j | i ∈ [m], j ∈ [n]},
and we use the notation I(m,n) to refer to the the item set I(m,n) = {bi,j |
i ∈ [m], j ∈ [n]} ∪ {bi,j | i ∈ [m], j ∈ [n]}. We will define two preference
profiles over A(m,n) and I(m,n): P1(m,n) and P2(m,n). Intuitively, given
a 3-SAT instance with n variables and m clauses, we will construct the sets
A(m,n) and I(m,n), which contain two agents and two items for each clause-
variable pair. The way that these agents and items are assigned to each other
in an assignment that is pareto optimal in both P1(m,n) and P2(m,n) will
encode a boolean assignment for the variable set of the instance. We define
the preference profile P1(m,n) as follows.
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ai,j ai,j
bi,j bi,j
ai,j ai,j
bi,j bi,j
Fig. 2 If p is pareto optimal in P1(m,n), then for each i ∈ [m], j ∈ [n], the trading graph
of P1(m,n) with respect to p contains one of these two sub-graphs.
• ai,j : bi,j > bi,j ∀i ∈ [m], j ∈ [n]
• ai,j : bi,j > bi,j ∀i ∈ [m], j ∈ [n]
Claim 3.6. An assignment p : A(m,n) → I(m,n) ∪ {b∅} is pareto optimal
in P1(m,n) if and only if {p(ai,j), p(ai,j)} = {bi,j , bi,j} for each i ∈ [m] and
j ∈ [n].
Proof. (⇒): Assume that p is pareto optimal in P1(m,n). Observe that bi,j and
bi,j are only acceptable by ai,j and ai,j . If |{p(ai,j), p(ai,j)} ∩ {bi,j , bi,j}| < 2,
then at least one of the items bi,j , bi,j does not have an owner; this implies
that at least one of the agents ai,j , ai,j admits a self loop, a contradiction to
Proposition 2.3 (see Figure 2).
(⇐): Assume that {p(ai,j), p(ai,j)} = {bi,j , bi,j} for each i ∈ [m] and
j ∈ [n]. Observe that the agents in A(m,n) pairwise respect each other in
P1(m,n); then, by Lemma 3.5, p does not admit trading cycles in P1(m,n).
Since p allocates all the items, it also does not admit self loops. Thus, by
Proposition 2.3, p is pareto optimal in P1(m,n).
We now define the second preference profile P2(m,n) over A(m,n) and
I(m,n). Intuitively, being pareto optimal in both P1(m,n) and P2(m,n)
requires the agents to “agree” with each other. That is, ai1,j gets bi1,j if
an only if ai2,j gets bi2,j for each i1 6= i2. For j ∈ [n], we denote the
sets P truej , and P falsej by P truej = {(ai,j , bi,j), (ai,j , bi,j) | i ∈ [m]}, and
P falsej = {(ai,j , bi,j), (ai,j , bi,j) | i ∈ [m]}. Informally speaking, P truej and P falsej
will correspond to setting the variable xj to true or false, respectively.
• am,j : bm,j > bm−1,j > bm,j ∀j ∈ [n]
• am,j : bm,j > bm−1,j > bm,j ∀j ∈ [n]
• ai,j : bi−1,j > bi,j > bi+1,j > bi,j ∀i ∈ {2, . . . ,m− 1},j ∈ [n]
• ai,j : bi−1,j > bi,j > bi+1,j > bi,j ∀i ∈ {2, . . . ,m− 1},j ∈ [n]
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ai−1,j ai−1,j ai,j ai,j
bi−1,j bi−1,j bi,j bi,j
Fig. 3 Example of the trading graph for the first case.
• a1,j : b1,j > b2,j > b1,j ∀j ∈ [n]
• a1,j : b1,j > b2,j > b1,j ∀j ∈ [n]
Claim 3.7. An assignment p : A(m,n)→ I(m,n)∪ {b∅} is pareto optimal in
both P1(m,n) and P2(m,n) if and only if for each j ∈ [n], either P truej ⊆ p or
P falsej ⊆ p.
Proof. (⇒): Assume that p is pareto optimal in both P1(m,n) and P2(m,n).
Towards a contradiction, suppose that there exists j ∈ [n] satisfying that both
P truej * p and P falsej * p. By Claim 3.6, there exist i1, i2 ∈ [m] such that
i1 < i2, satisfying that either (1) p(ai1,j) = bi1,j and p(ai2,j) = bi2,j , or (2)
p(ai1,j) = bi1,j and p(ai2,j) = bi2,j . For the first case, note that there must
exist i ∈ [m] such that i1 ≤ i < i2, p(ai,j) = bi,j , and p(ai+1,j) = bi+1,j . Then
we have that p admits the trading cycle (ai,j , bi,j , ai+1,j , bi+1,j) in P2(m,n), a
contradiction. For the second case, we have that there exists i ∈ [m] such that
i1 ≤ i < i2, p(ai,j) = bi,j , and p(ai+1,j) = bi+1,j . By Claim 3.6, p(ai,j) = bi,j
and p(ai+1,j) = bi+1,j , then p admits the trading cycle (ai,j , bi,j , ai+1,j , bi+1,j)
in P2(m,n), a contradiction.
(⇐): Assume that for each j ∈ [n], either P truej ⊆ p or P falsej ⊆ p.
By Claim 3.6, p is pareto optimal in P1(m,n). Then by the construc-
tion of P2(m,n), observe that every possible trading cycle in P2(m,n) has
one of the forms: (1) (ai,j , bi,j , ai−1,j , bi−1,j) (Shown in Figure 3) or (2)
(ai,j , bi,j , ai−1,j , bi−1,j) where i ∈ {2, . . . ,m}. This implies that there ex-
ist j ∈ [n], and i ∈ {2, . . . ,m} such that either (1) p(ai,j) = bi,j and
p(ai−1,j) = bi,j or (2) p(ai,j) = bi,j and p(ai−1,j) = bi,j . Thus, both P truej ( p
and P falsej ( p, a contradiction.
Let D = (X , C) be an instance of 3-SAT where X = {x1, . . . , xn} is the
set of variables, and C = {C1, . . . , Cm} is the set of clauses, each of size 3.
In order to construct the third preference profile P3(D), order the literals in
each clause arbitrarily, such that Ci = `1i ∨ `2i ∨ `3i for each i ∈ [m]. The third
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preference profile is responsible for the satisfiability of the formula. Let us
define the following:
Definition 3.8. Let Ci = `1i ∨ `2i ∨ `3i ∈ C. We define indD(i, j) as the index
of the variable which appears in the j-th literal in Ci for each j ∈ [3].
For example, if Ci = x3 ∨ x1 ∨ x5, then indD(i, 1) = 3, indD(i, 2) = 1,
and indD(i, 3) = 5. Briefly put, each assignment p that is pareto opti-
mal in the profiles P1(m,n),P2(m,n), and P3(D) contains either P truej =
{(ai,j , bi,j), (ai,j , bi,j)|i ∈ [m]} or P falsej = {(ai,j , bi,j), (ai,j , bi,j)|i ∈ [m]} for
every j ∈ [n], and for each clause Ci = `1i ∨`2i ∨`3i ∈ C, there exists at least one
satisfied literal `ji . Being pareto optimal in P3(D) enforces ai,indi(1), ai,indi(2)
and ai,indi(3) to admit a trading cycle if none of their corresponding literals is
satisfied. We define the following:
Definition 3.9. For each i ∈ [m], j ∈ [3], we define bD(i, j) ={
bi,indD(i,j) `
j
i is positive
bi,indD(i,j) `
j
i is negative
.
Intuitively, when ai,indD(i,j) gets bD(i, j) and ai,indD(i,j) gets bD(i, j), it
means that `ji is “satisfied”. Preference profile P3(D) is defined as follows:
• ai,indD(i,3) : bD(i, 3) > bD(i, 2) > bD(i, 3) ∀i ∈ [m]
• ai,indD(i,2) : bD(i, 2) > bD(i, 1) > bD(i, 2) ∀i ∈ [m]
• ai,indD(i,1) : bD(i, 1) > bD(i, 3) > bD(i, 1) ∀i ∈ [m]
• ai,indD(i,r) : bD(i, r) > bD(i, r) ∀i ∈ [m], r ∈ [3]
• ai,j : bi,j > bi,j ∀i ∈ [m], j ∈ [n] such that xj does not appear in Ci
• ai,j : bi,j > bi,j ∀i ∈ [m], j ∈ [n] such that xj does not appear in Ci
Claim 3.10. An assignment p : A(m,n) → I(m,n) ∪ {b∅} is pareto optimal
in P1(m,n), P2(m,n), and P3(D) if and only if:
• For each j ∈ [n], either P truej ⊆ p or P falsej ⊆ p.
• For each clause Ci = `1i ∨ `2i ∨ `3i ∈ C, there exists at least one j ∈ [3] such
that p(ai,indD(i,j)) = bD(i, j).
Proof. (⇒): Assume that p is pareto optimal in P1(m,n), P2(m,n), and
P3(D). Claim 3.7 implies that p satisfies the first condition. We show that
p also satisfies the second condition: Observe that every tuple of the form
(ai,indD(i,3),bD(i, 3), ai,indD(i,2),bD(i, 2), ai,indD(i,1) ,bD(i, 1)) is a trading cy-
cle in P3(D) (see Figure 4). Then by Proposition 2.3, for each i ∈ [m], there
must exists j ∈ [3] such that p(ai,indD(i,j)) = bD(i, j).
(⇐): Assume that p satisfies both conditions. By Claim 3.7, p is pareto
optimal in both P1(m,n) and P2(m,n). We claim that p is also pareto op-
timal in P3(D): First, p does not admit self loops in P3(D) since all the
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ai,indD(i,3)ai,indD(i,2)ai,indD(i,1)
bD(i, 3)bD(i, 2)bD(i, 1)
Fig. 4 If p is pareto optimal in both P1(m,n) and P2(m,n), then every potential trading
cycle in P3(D) has this form; and it occurs when P falseindD(i,1), P
false
indD(i,2)
, P falseindD(i,3)
⊆ p.
items are allocated. Second, observe that every trading cycle in P3(D) is of
the form (ai,indD(i,3),bD(i, 3), ai,indD(i,2),bD(i, 2), ai,indD(i,1),bD(i, 1)). By the
second condition (in each clause there exists at least one “satisfied” literal), p
does not allow cycles of such form. Thus, we conclude that p pareto optimal
in P3(D).
Lemma 3.11. An instance D = (X , C) of 3-SAT such that |X | = n and |C| =
m is a Yes-instance if and only if there exists an assignment p : A(m,n) →
I(m,n) ∪ {b∅} that is pareto optimal in P1(m,n), P2(m,n), and P3(D).
Proof. (⇒): Assume that D is a Yes-instance. Then, there exists a boolean
assignment ϕ : X → {T, F} that satisfies every clause in C. We construct an
assignment p : A(m,n)→ I(m,n)∪{b∅} as follows. For each xj ∈ X , if ϕ(xj) =
T , we add P truej to p, and otherwise, we add P falsej to p. We claim that p is
pareto optimal in all three preference profiles. First, by Claim 3.7, p is pareto
optimal in P1(m,n) and in P2(m,n). Second, it is pareto optimal in the third
layer: Since ϕ satisfies every clause, we have that for each Ci = `1i ∨`2i ∨`3i ∈ C,
there exists j ∈ [3] such that (1) if `ji is positive, then ϕ(xindD(i,j)) = T , and
(2) if `ji is negative, then ϕ(xindD(i,j)) = F . By the definition of bD(i, j) and
the construction of p, we have that p(ai,j) = bD(i, j), and by Claim 3.10, p is
pareto optimal in P3(D).
(⇐): Assume that there exists an assignment p that is pareto optimal in
P1(m,n), P2(m,n) and P3(D). By Claim 3.10, for each j ∈ [n], either P truej ⊆ p
or P falsej ⊆ p. We define a boolean assignment for (X , C) by ϕ(xj) = T if
P truej ⊆ p, and ϕ(xj) = F if P falsej ⊆ p. By Claim 3.10, for each clause
Ci = `1i ∨ `2i ∨ `3i ∈ C, there exists j ∈ [3] such that p(ai,indD(i,j)) = bD(i, j).
By the construction of ϕ, ϕ(`ji ) = T . Hence, ϕ satisfies each clause in C, and
therefore D is a Yes-instance.
We rely on these results to design a polynomial reduction from 3-SAT to
Globally Optimal Assignment.
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Theorem 2. 3-SAT is polynomial-time reducible to Globally Optimal
Assignment where α = ` = 3, and the maximal length of a preference list is
d = 4.
Proof. Given an instance D = (X , C) of 3-SAT, such that |X | = n, and
|C| = m, we construct an instance of Globally Optimal Assignment with
the agent set A(m,n), and the item set I(m,n), consisting of 3 layers. The first
layer contains P1(m,n), the second contains P2(m,n), and the third contains
P3(D), and we finally set α = ` = 3. The reduction clearly can be done in poly-
nomial time. The correctness of the reduction is derived by Lemma 3.11, which
implies that there exists a 3-globally optimal assignment for the constructed
instance if and only if D is a Yes-instance.
Since `+α+d in the statement above is upper bounded by a fixed constant,
we conclude the following.
Corollary 3.12. Globally Optimal Assignment is para-NP-hard with
respect to the parameter `+ α+ d.
4 Kernelization
We first give a simple lemma that will help us to design a polynomial kernel for
Globally Optimal Assignment with respect to the parameter #agents+`.
Lemma 4.1. Let (A, I, P ) be an instance of the Assignment problem where
|A| = n. Then, for any agent a ∈ A and pareto optimal assignment, a is
assigned to b∅ or to one of the n most preferred items in its preference list.
Proof. Let p be a pareto optimal assignment for (A, I, P ). By Proposition 2.5,
there exists a permutation pi = (a1, . . . , an) on A such that applying serial
dictatorship with respect to pi results in p. Let i ∈ [n]. When the mechanism
is in the i-th step, it has already allocated at most i − 1 items from I to
agents a1, . . . , ai−1. Hence, p(ai) = b∅, or p(ai) is the most preferred item of
ai among the remaining items in its preference list, and is ranked at position
j ≤ i ≤ n.
Theorem 3. Globally Optimal Assignment admits a kernel of size
O(`n2) where n = #agents.
Proof. Given an instance of Globally Optimal Assignment I1 =
(A, I, P1, . . . , P`, α), the kernel reduces each preference profile Pi to a pref-
erence profile P ′i by keeping only the n first-ranked items in each preference
list (shown in Figure 5). Let I ′ be a set containing the items ranked in the
first n positions in some preference list in I1; then, |I ′| ≤ `n2. The resulting
instance is I2 = (A, I ′, P ′1, . . . , P ′` , α), and it satisfies |I2| = O(`n2). We claim
that an assignment p is α-globally optimal for the instance I1 if and only if it
is α-globally optimal for the instance I2.
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an :
b
b
b
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b b b
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b b b
b b b
b b b
n
︷ ︸︸ ︷
Fig. 5 The kernel keeps only the n most preferred items in each preference list; thus the
size of the reduced instance is O(`n2).
(⇒) Let p be an α-globally optimal assignment for I1; then, there exist
α layers i1, . . . , iα, such that for each j ∈ [α], p is pareto optimal in Pij . By
Lemma 4.1, each agent a ∈ A is assigned an item that appears in the first n
items in its preference list in each Pij . Hence, p assigns an acceptable item to
a in each P ′ij . Moreover, it is pareto optimal in each P
′
ij
, as otherwise, it would
contradict p’s optimality in each Pij .
(⇐) Let p be an α-globally optimal assignment for I2. Then by Proposi-
tion 2.5, there exist α profile-permutation pairs (P ′i1 , pi1), . . . , (P
′
iα
, piα), such
that for each j ∈ [α], applying serial dictatorship on profile P ′ij with respect
to pij results in p. Observe that applying serial dictatorship on each Pij with
respect to the same permutation pij results also in p. Therefore, by Proposi-
tion 2.5, p is also α-globally optimal for I1.
Corollary 4.2. Globally Optimal Assignment admits a polynomial ker-
nel with respect to the parameter k = #agents + `.
Before we present a double-exponential kernel for Globally Optimal
Assignment with respect to the parameter k = #items + `, let us define the
following.
Definition 4.3. Let Q = (A, I, P1, . . . , P`, α) be an instance of Globally
Optimal Assignment and a ∈ A. The agent class of a in Q, C(a,Q), is the
tuple that contains the preference lists of a in all the layers, namely, C(a,Q) =
(<1a, . . . , <`a). For a given tuple of length ` consisting of linear orderings on
subsets of I, C ⊆ (I × I)`, define A(C,Q) = {a ∈ A | C(a,Q) = C}.
Theorem 4. Globally Optimal Assignment admits a kernel of size
O((m!)`+1) where m = #items.
Proof. Given an instance of Globally Optimal Assignment Q =
(A, I, P1, . . . , P`, α), the kernelization algorithm works as follows (formally de-
scribed in Algorithm 1): It removes from A agents which share the same agent
class together with all their preference lists, such that in the resulting instance
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there will be at most m + 1 agents in the set A(C(a,Q), Q), for each a ∈ A.
Intuitively, the idea behind the correctness is that since there are m items,
at most m agents in A(C(a,Q), Q) will be assigned to items; we keep at most
m + 1 agents (rather than m) in each agent class to cover the case where an
agent is assigned to b∅ and admits a self-loop. The kernelization algorithm
clearly runs in a polynomial time.
foreach a ∈ A do
construct A(C(a,Q), Q)
if |A(C(a,Q), Q)| > m+ 1 then
remove |A(C(a,Q), Q)| −m− 1 arbitrary agents from
A(C(a,Q), Q) together with all their preference lists
end
end
return the reduced instance
Algorithm 1: Kernel for Globally Optimal Assignment with re-
spect to the parameter k = #items + `.
Assume that we run the kernel on I1 = (A1, I, P1, . . . , P`, α) to obtain an
instance I2 = (A2, I, Q1, . . . , Q`, α). We first observe the following:
Claim 4.4. |I2| = O((m!)`+1).
Proof. Note that there exist
∑m
j=0
(
m
j
) · j! = ∑mj=0 m!j!(m−j)!j! = m!∑mj=0 1j! ≤
e · m! = O(m!) possible linear orderings of subsets of I. Then, there exist
at most O((m!)`) different combinations of such ` orderings, implying that
there exist at most O((m!)`) possible agent classes defined over the item set
I. Since for each agent class C, |A2(C, I2)| ≤ m+ 1, we have that A2 satisfies
|A2| = Σagent class C|A2(C, I2)| ≤ (m!)` · (m+ 1). Thus, |I2| = O((m!)` · (m+
1)) = O((m!)`+1). ♦
We now prove that I1 is a Yes-instance if and only if I2 is a Yes-instance.
(⇒): Assume that there exists an α-globally optimal assignment p for
I1. Then, there exist α layers i1, . . . , iα of I1 in which p is pareto opti-
mal. We create an assignment q : A2 → I ∪ {b∅} for the reduced instance
as follows: For each a ∈ A2, let p(A1(C(a, I1), I1)) denote the set of items
allocated to the agents from A1(C(a, I1), I1) by p. We allocate the items
in p(A1(C(a, I1), I1)) to agents in A2(C(a, I2), I2) arbitrarily (observe that
C(a, I1) = C(a, I2)). Agents that do not have available items are assigned
to b∅. First, we claim that q does not admit self loops in these layers. Observe
that q allocates all the items which are allocated by p, since there are at most
m items, and the algorithm keeps all or exactly m + 1 agents from each set
A1(C(a, I1), I1). As a result, q cannot admit self loops in layers i1, . . . , iα of
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I2 since if there exists a self loop in the new instance with agent a2 ∈ A2,
then there is an agent a1 ∈ A1 with the same agent class as a2, that admits
a self loop in I1. Formally, the sets A1(C(a, I1), I1) and A2(C(a, I2), I2) sat-
isfy |A2(C(a, I2), I2)| ≤ |A1(C(a, I1), I1)|. Since the agents in these sets are
allocated the same number of items by p and q, if there exists an agent in
A2(C(a, I2), I2) that admits a self loop in I2, there must exist an agent in
A1(C(a, I1), I1) that admits a self loop in I1. Second, we claim that q does
not admit trading cycles in these layers. For the sake of contradiction, sup-
pose there exists a layer ij in I2, and t agents a′1, . . . , a′t ∈ A2 that admit
a trading cycle (a′1, p(a′1), . . . , a′t, p(a′t)) in Qij . By the construction of q, ob-
serve that there exist t agents a1, . . . , at ∈ A, such that for each i ∈ [t],
C(ai, I1) = C(a′i, I2), and q(a′i) = p(ai). Then, p admits the trading cycle
(a1, p(a1), . . . , at, p(at)) in Pij . This gives a contradiction to Proposition 2.3.
(⇐): Assume that there exists an α-globally optimal assignment q for I2.
Then there exist α layers i1, . . . , iα in I2 in which q is pareto optimal. We
denote an assignment p for I1 by p(a) =
{
q(a) a ∈ A2
b∅ otherwise
, and we claim that
p is pareto optimal in layers i1, . . . , iα in I1. By the construction of p, for each
a1 ∈ A1 \A2, there exists an agent a2 ∈ A2 such that C(a1, I1) = C(a2, I2) and
p(a1) = q(a2). Namely, there exists a mapping f between agents inA1 to agents
in A2 such that for each a1 ∈ A1, C(a1, I1) = C(f(a1), I2) and p(a1) = q(f(a1)).
If p admits a trading cycle (a1, p(a1), . . . , ar, p(ar)) in some layer ij of I1, then
q admits the trading cycle (f(a1), q(f(a1)), . . . , f(ar), q(f(ar))) in layer ij of
I2. If p admits a self loop in layer ij of I1 with agent a1 ∈ A1, then q admits
a self loop with agent f(a1) in layer ij of I2. Thus by Proposition 2.3, we
conclude that p is α-globally optimal in I1.
Corollary 4.5. Globally Optimal Assignment is FPT with respect to the
parameter k = #items + `.
Before we present our next results, let us provide the following observation
on which we will rely in the next 3 cross-compositions.
Observation 4.6. Let D = (X , C) be an instance of 3-SAT of size n.
Then there exists an equivalent 3-SAT instance U = (XU , CU ) where XU =
{x1, . . . , xn} and |CU | = n.
Proof. Since D has size n, it has at most n variables and at most n clauses.
Then there exists a one to one mapping from X to XU . We pick such arbitrary
mapping and replace each variable in D with its corresponding variable in
XU . We then append the clause set with copies of some existing clause until it
has size n, and denote the resulting clause multi-set by CU . The new instance
U = (XU , CU ) is clearly equivalent to D.
Theorem 5. There does not exist a polynomial kernel for Globally Opti-
mal Assignment with respect to the parameters k1 = #agents + #items + α
and k2 = #agents + #items + (`− α), unless NP⊆coNP/poly.
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Proof. We provide two cross-compositions from 3-SAT to Globally Opti-
mal Assignment. Given instances of 3-SATD1 = (X1, C1), . . . , Dt = (Xt, Ct)
of the same size n ∈ N for some t ∈ N, we first modify each instance Di
to have Xi = {x1, . . . , xn} and |Ci| = n using Observation 4.6. The two
algorithms construct instances of Globally Optimal Assignment with
2n2 + d2 log te agents, 2n2 + d2 log te items, and 2 + t layers, that share the
same agent set and item set (Shown in Figure 6). We first provide the first
two layers, which are identical in both constructions, and then we provide the
remaining t layers for each construction separately. We create the agent sets
A(n, n) = {ai,j | i, j ∈ [n]}∪{ai,j | i, j ∈ [n]} and At = {ci | i ∈ [dlog te]}∪{ci |
i ∈ [dlog te]}, and the item sets I(n, n) = {bi,j | i, j ∈ [n]} ∪ {bi,j | i, j ∈ [n]}
and It = {di | i ∈ [dlog te]}∪{di | i ∈ [dlog te]}. Both constructions are defined
over the agent set A = A(m,n) ∪ At and the item set I = I(m,n) ∪ It. Intu-
itively, we use A(m,n) and I(m,n) in order to construct the preference profiles
P1(m,n), P2(m,n) and P3(Di) for each i ∈ [t]. The agents from At “choose” a
Yes-instance (if one exists) from D1, . . . , Dt; their goal is to enforce an assign-
ment to be pareto optimal in (at most) one profile among P3(D1), . . . , P3(Dt).
The first layer is a composition of P1(n, n) with additional 2dlog te prefer-
ence lists that belong to the agents from At and is defined as follows:
• ai,j : bi,j > bi,j ∀i, j ∈ [n]
• ai,j : bi,j > bi,j ∀i, j ∈ [m]
• ci : di > di ∀i ∈ [dlog te]
• ci : di > di ∀i ∈ [dlog te]
The second layer consists of the preference profile P2(n, n) together with
the same preferences of the agents from At as in the first layer:
• an,j : bn,j > bn−1,j > bn,j ∀j ∈ [n]
• an,j : bn,j > bn−1,j > bn,j ∀j ∈ [n]
• ai,j : bi−1,j > bi,j > bi+1,j > bi,j ∀i ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1},j ∈ [n]
• ai,j : bi−1,j > bi,j > bi+1,j > bi,j ∀i ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1},j ∈ [n]
• a1,j : b1,j > b2,j > b1,j ∀j ∈ [n]
• a1,j : b1,j > b2,j > b1,j ∀j ∈ [n]
• ci : di > di ∀i ∈ [dlog te]
• ci : di > di ∀i ∈ [dlog te]
Definition 4.7. For each j ∈ [dlog te] and b ∈ {0, 1}, we define d(j, b) ={
dj b = 0
dj b = 1
.
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P1(n, n) P2(n, n)
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
k = #agents + #items + α
k = #agents + #items + (`− α)
Layer 1 Layer 2
Layers 3, . . . , t+ 2
Pdefault(At) Pdefault(At)
Fig. 6 The first two layers are identical in both cross compositions; Pdefault(At) is the
preference profile in which both ci and ci have the preference list di > di for each i ∈ [dlog te].
The first layer is a composition of P1(n, n) and Pdefault(At), and the second layer is a
composition of P2(n, n) and Pdefault(At). The rest t layers will be defined separately for
each parameter.
We also denote M0j = {(cj , dj), (cj , dj)} and M1j = {(cj , dj), (cj , dj)}. In-
formally speaking, the sets M0j and M1j will correspond to the value of the j-th
bit in the binary representation of i ∈ [t] such that Di is a Yes-instance. The
sets M bj that are contained in a pareto optimal assignment will “encode” the
index of some Yes-instance (if one exists). For each i ∈ N, j ∈ [dlog ie], we define
i[j] as the j-th bit in the binary representation of i, i.e. i = i[1]i[2] . . . i[dlog te].
We denote the set Mi by Mi =
⋃dlog te
j=1 M
i[j]
j . We first claim the following.
Claim 4.8. An assignment p : A → I ∪ {b∅} is pareto optimal in the first
two layers if and only if it is pareto optimal in both P1(n, n) and P2(n, n), and
there exists exactly one i ∈ [t] such that Mi ⊆ p.
Proof. (⇒): Assume that p is pareto optimal in both layers. Since P1(n, n) is
contained in the first layer, p is pareto optimal in P1(n, n). Similarly, p is pareto
optimal in P2(n, n) since P2(n, n) is contained in the second layer. Observe that
for each i ∈ [dlog te], di and di are both acceptable by ci and ci; and are the
only items acceptable by them. Then, we have that {p(ci), p(ci)} = {di, di}
(else we get a self loop), implying that for each j ∈ [dlog te], either M0j ⊆ p
or M1j ⊆ p. Let i[j] = 0 if M0j ⊆ p and i[j] = 1 if M1j ⊆ p. Let i ∈ N be a
number whose binary representation is i = i[1] . . . i[dlog te]; then, we have that
Mi ⊆ p. We prove that i is unique. Towards a contradiction, suppose there
exists e ∈ [t] such that e 6= i and p satisfies that both Mi ⊆ p and Me ⊆ p.
Since e 6= i, there exists a place in their binary representations where they
differ, i.e. there exists r ∈ [dlog te] such that e[r] 6= i[r]. Thus, both M0r ⊆ p
and M1r ⊆ p, and this gives us a contradiction.
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(⇐): Assume that p is pareto optimal in both P1(n, n) and P2(n, n), and
there exists exactly one i ∈ [t] such that Mi ⊆ p. First, we prove that p is
pareto optimal in the first layer: Observe that all the agents pairwise respect
each other in the first layer; then, by Lemma 3.5, p does not admit trading
cycles in this layer. Moreover, by Claim 3.6, p allocates all the items, hence it
does not admit self loops. Thus, Proposition 2.3 implies that p is pareto optimal
in the first layer. Second, we prove that p is pareto optimal in the second layer:
Observe that the agents from At respect each other in the second layer; then
by Lemma 3.5, p does not admit trading cycles among them. Furthermore,
notice that the set of items acceptable by the agents from A(n, n) is disjoint
from the set of items acceptable by the agents from At, thus p cannot admit
trading cycles that consist of both agents from At and agents from A(n, n).
Lastly, since p is pareto optimal in P2(n, n), Proposition 2.3 implies that it
does not admit trading cycles among agents from A(n, n). Then, we have by
Proposition 2.3 that p is pareto optimal in the second layer. ♦
We define the remaining t layers separately for each construction.
The parameter k = #agents + #items + α. The cross composition for this
parameter constructs layer 2 + i as a composition of P3(Di) with a unique
combination of preference lists of length 1 that belong to agents from At. It is
defined as follows:
• aq,indDi (q,3) : bDi(q, 3) > bDi(q, 2) > bDi(q, 3) ∀q ∈ [m]
• aq,indDi (q,2) : bDi(q, 2) > bDi(q, 1) > bDi(q, 2) ∀q ∈ [m]
• aq,indDi (q,1) : bDi(q, 1) > bDi(q, 3) > bDi(q, 1) ∀q ∈ [m]
• aq,indDi (q,r) : bDi(q, r) > bDi(q, r) ∀q ∈ [m], r ∈ [3]
• aq,j : bq,j > bq,j ∀q ∈ [m], j ∈ [n] such that xj does not appear in the
q-th clause in Ci
• aq,j : bq,j > bq,j ∀q ∈ [m], j ∈ [n] such that xj does not appear in the
q-th clause in Ci
• cj : d(j, i[j]) ∀j ∈ [dlog te]
• cj : d(j, i[j]) ∀j ∈ [dlog te]
An illustration of the last t layers in shown in Figure 7.Intuitively, the
goal of the agents from At is to enforce each assignment to be pareto optimal
in at most one layer among 3, . . . , t. We finally set α = 3. Note that the
construction can be done in time that is polynomial in Σti=1|Di|. Before we
prove the correctness of the construction, let us prove the following:
Claim 4.9. Let p : A → I ∪ {b∅} be an assignment and i ∈ [t]. Then p is
pareto optimal in layer 2 + i if and only if it is pareto optimal in P3(Di) and
Mi ⊆ p.
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P3(D1)
Layer 3
P (At, 1)
. . . . . .
P3(Di)
Layer 2+i
P (At, i)
. . . . . .
P3(Di)
Layer 2+t
P (At, t)
Fig. 7 The last t layers constructed for the parameter #agents+#items+α. An assignment
can be pareto optimal in at most one layer among layers 3, . . . , t. If p is a 3-globally optimal
assignment, then the layer 2 + i in which it is pareto optimal corresponds to a Yes-instance
Di; This i ∈ [t] is encoded by the allocations of the agents from At; P (At, i) is the preference
profile in which cj accepts only d(j, i[j]) and cj accepts only d(j, i[j]), for each j ∈ [dlog te].
Proof. (⇒): Assume that p is pareto optimal in layer 2+ i. First, since P3(Di)
is contained in the preference profile of layer 2 + i, we infer that p is pareto
optimal in P3(Di). Second, observe that for each i ∈ [dlog te], ci only accepts
d(j, i[j]) and cj only accepts d(j, i[j]). Furthermore, d(j, i[j]) and d(j, i[j]) are
only acceptable by these agents. This enforces p to satisfy p(ci) = d(j, i[j])
and p(cj) = d(j, i[j]) as otherwise, p would admit self loops. Hence, p satisfies
Mi ⊆ p.
(⇐): Assume that p is pareto optimal in P3(Di) and that Mi ⊆ p. Notice
that p allocates all the items, thus it cannot admit self loops in layer 2 + i. In
addition, since each agent from At only accepts a single item, p cannot admit
trading cycles among agents from At. Moreover, since P3(Di) is contained in
the preference profile in layer 2 + i, and p is pareto optimal in P3(Di), by
Proposition 2.3 we have that p does not admit trading cycles among agents
from A(n, n). We have also that p does not admit trading cycles that contain
both agents from At and agents from A(n, n) since their sets of acceptable
items are disjoint. Then we infer that p is pareto optimal in layer 2 + i. ♦
Claim 4.10. Let p : A → I ∪ {b∅} be an assignment. Then there exists at
most one i ∈ [t] such that p is pareto optimal in layer 2 + i.
Proof. Towards a contradiction, suppose there exist i1, i2 ∈ [t] such that i1 6=
i2 and p is pareto optimal in both layers 2 + i1 and 2 + i2. By Claim 4.9, both
Mi1 ⊆ p and Mi2 ⊆ p, a contradiction to Claim 4.8. ♦
We now prove that there exists i ∈ [t] such that Di is a Yes-instance
of 3-SAT if and only if there exists a 3-globally optimal assignment for the
constructed instance.
(⇒): Assume there exists i ∈ [t] such that Di is a Yes-instance. By
Lemma 3.11, there exists an assignment p that is pareto optimal in the profiles
P1(n, n), P2(n, n) and P3(Di). We extend p by p ← p ∪Mi. Since p allocates
all the items from I, it is pareto optimal in the first two layers by Claim 4.8.
By Claim 4.9, it is pareto optimal in layer 2 + i. Thus, p is 3-globally optimal
for the constructed instance.
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(⇐): Suppose there exists a 3-globally optimal assignment for the con-
structed instance. By Claim 4.10, p is pareto optimal in at most one among
layers 3, . . . , t, say, layer 2 + i where i ∈ [t]. By Claim 4.9, p is pareto optimal
in P3(Di) and by Claim 4.8, it is pareto optimal in both P1(n, n) and P2(n, n).
Thus we have by Lemma 3.11 that Di is a Yes-instance.
Since the constructed instance satisfies #agents + #items + α = O(n2 +
log t), Proposition 2.10 implies that Globally Optimal Assignment does
not admit a polynomial kernel with respect to the parameter k = #agents +
#items + α, unless NP⊆coNP/poly.
The parameter k = #agents + #items + (` − α). Similarly to the previous
cross composition, the goal of the agents in At here is to encode some i ∈ [t]
such that Di is a Yes-instance (if one exists). This is done by enforcing every
`-pareto optimal assignment to be pareto optimal in some profile P3(Di) and
preventing the existence of trading cycles in all layers 2 + j where j 6= i. Let
i ∈ [t], we define layer 2 + i as follows:
• aq,indDi (q,3) : bDi(q, 3) > bDi(q, 2) > bDi(q, 3) ∀q ∈ [m]
• aq,indDi (q,2) : bDi(q, 2) > bDi(q, 1) > bDi(q, 2) ∀q ∈ [m]
• aq,indDi (q,1) : bDi(q, 1) > bDi(q, 3) > bDi(q, 1) ∀q ∈ [m]
• aq,indDi (q,r) : bDi(q, r) > bDi(q, r) ∀q ∈ [m], r ∈ [3]
• aq,j : bq,j > bq,j ∀q ∈ [m], j ∈ [n] such that xj does not appear in the
q-th clause in Ci
• aq,j : bq,j > bq,j ∀q ∈ [m], j ∈ [n] such that xj does not appear in the
q-th clause in Ci
• cj : d(j, i[j]) > d(j − 1, i[j − 1]) > d(j, i[j]) ∀j ∈ {2, . . . , dlog te}
• c1 : d(1, i[1]) > {bq,r, bq,r | q, r ∈ [n]} > d(1, i[1]) ∀j ∈ {2, . . . , dlog te}
• cj : d(j, i[j]) > d(j, i[j]) ∀j ∈ [dlog te]
The construction is illustrated in Figure 8. We now claim the following.
Claim 4.11. Let p : A → I ∪ {b∅} be an assignment such that p is pareto
optimal in the first two layers and let i ∈ [t]. Then p is pareto optimal in layer
2 + i if and only if: (1) p allocates all the items in I, and (2) Mi * p or p is
pareto optimal in P3(Di).
Proof. (⇒): Assume that p is pareto optimal in layer 2 + i. By Claim 4.8,
p is pareto optimal in both P1(n, n) and P2(n, n) and there exists ex-
actly one j ∈ [t] such that Mj ⊆ p. By the construction of the first
layer, p must allocate all the items since otherwise it would admit self
loops. Notice that the only possible trading cycle in layer 2 + i, for any
i ∈ [t], has the form: (aq,indDi (q,3),bDi(q, 3), aq,indDi (q,2),bDi(q, 2), aq,indDi (q,1)
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Layer 3
P3(D1)
Q(At, 1)
. . . . . .
Layer 2+t
P3(Dt)
Q(At, t)
. . . . . .
. . .
Layer 2+i
P3(Di)
Q(At, i)
. . . . . .
. . .
. . .
Fig. 8 The last t layers constructed for the parameter #agents+#items+(`−α). Q(At, i)
consists of the preference lists of the agents from At in layer 2 + i, for each i ∈ [t]. All the
possible cycles in layers 3, . . . , t can be decomposed into a path with 3 items in the trading
graph of P3(Di), connected to a path with dlog te items in the trading graph of Q(At, i), and
an edge connecting the end point of the second path to the start point of the first path. For
an `-globally optimal assignment, the second path will be cut in most layers, then no cycles
will exist. There will exist exactly one layer 2 + i for which the trading graph of Q(At, i)
contains such path. This implies that the trading graph of P3(Di) must not contain paths
with 3 items, then Di is a Yes-instance.
,bDi(q, 1), cdlog te,d(dlog te, i[dlog te]), . . . , c1,d(1, i[1])) and it exists only when
p is not pareto optimal in P3(Di) and Mi ⊆ p.
(⇐): Suppose that p satisfies that Mi * p or p is pareto optimal in P3(Di).
By the observation in the previous direction, p does not admit trading cycles
in layer 2 + i. Thus, p is pareto optimal in layer 2 + i. ♦
We prove that there exists i ∈ [t] such that Di is a Yes-instance if and only
if there exists an `-globally optimal assignment for the constructed instance.
(⇒): Suppose there exists i ∈ [t] such that Di is a Yes-instance. We extend
p by p← p∪Mi. By Lemma 3.11, p is pareto optimal in P1(n, n), P2(n, n) and
P3(Di). First, since all the items in It are allocated, by Claims 4.9 and 4.10
we have that p is pareto optimal in the first two layers. Second, by Claim 4.11,
we have that p is pareto optimal in layer 2 + i. Third, let j ∈ [t] \ {i}. By
the construction of p we have that Mj * p, then by Claim 4.11, p is pareto
optimal in layer 2 + j. Then we conclude that p is `-globally optimal for the
constructed instance.
(⇐): Suppose that there exists an `-globally optimal assignment for the
constructed instance p. By Claims 4.9 and 4.10, p is pareto optimal in both
Parameterized Analysis of Assignment Under Multiple Preferences 27
P1(n, n) and P2(n, n) and there exists i ∈ [t] such that Mi ⊆ p. Claim 4.11
implies that p is pareto optimal in P3(Di). Thus, by Lemma 3.11, Di is a
Yes-instance.
We show the the same result holds also for the parameter #items + `.
Theorem 6. There does not exist a polynomial kernel for Globally Opti-
mal Assignment with respect to k = #items + `, unless NP⊆coNP/poly.
Proof. We present a cross-composition from 3-SAT to Globally Optimal
Assignment. Given instances of 3-SAT D1 = (X1, C1), . . . , Dt = (Xt, Ct) of
the same size n ∈ N for some t ∈ N, we first modify each instance Di to have
Xi = {x1, . . . , xn} and |Ci| = n using Observation 4.6. We define an agent set
Ai(n, n) of n2 agents for each instance Di by Ai(n, n) = {air,j , air,j | r, j ∈ [n]}
and we set A =
⋃t
i=1Ai(n, n). We also create the item set I = I(n, n). The
constructed instance is defined over A and I, and it consists of 2dlog te + 2
layers. Notice that we have a total number of 2tn2 agents and 2n2 items,
then in every assignment for the constructed instance, there will exist agents
which get no items. Intuitively, the goal of the first 2dlog te layers is to enforce
every α-globally optimal assignment to allocate the items in I only to agents
that correspond to a Yes-instance (if one exists). They are constructed as
compositions the profile P1(n, n) over the agent set Ai(n, n) and the item set
I(n, n) for each i ∈ [t] (namely, replacing each aq,j with aiq,j in P1(n, n)). Layer
2dlog te+1 is constructed as a composition of the profile P2(n, n) over Ai(n, n)
and I(n, n) for each i ∈ [t], and the last layer is a composition of the profiles
P3(Di) over Ai(n, n) and I(n, n) for each i ∈ [t]. We first construct the first
dlog te layers. Informally speaking, for i ∈ [dlog te], the preference profile in
layer i requires an assignment to allocate b∅ to any agent whose corresponding
instance is Dj such that the i-th bit in the binary representation of j is 0.
Layer i is formally defined as follows:
• arq,j : bq,j > bq,j ∀q, j ∈ [n], r ∈ [t] such that r[i] = 0
• arq,j : bq,j > bq,j ∀q, j ∈ [n], r ∈ [t] such that r[i] = 0
• arq,j : ∅ ∀q, j ∈ [n], r ∈ [t] such that r[i] = 1
• arq,j : ∅ ∀q, j ∈ [n], r ∈ [t] such that r[i] = 1
We define the next dlog te layers. Intuitively, layer dlog ie+i is different from
layer i such that it requires an assignment to allocate b∅ to any agent whose
corresponding instance is Dj such that the i-th bit in the binary representation
of j is 1 (instead of 0). For each i ∈ [dlog te], layer dlog te+i is defined as follows:
• arq,j : bq,j > bq,j ∀q, j ∈ [n], r ∈ [t] such that r[i] = 1
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• arq,j : bq,j > bq,j ∀q, j ∈ [n], r ∈ [t] such that r[i] = 1
• arq,j : ∅ ∀q, j ∈ [n], r ∈ [t] such that r[i] = 0
• arq,j : ∅ ∀q, j ∈ [n], r ∈ [t] such that r[i] = 0
Layer 2dlog te+1 is a composition of the profile P2(n, n) over the agent set
Ai(n, n) and the item set I(n, n) for each i ∈ [t].
• ain,j : bn,j > bn−1,j > bn,j ∀i ∈ [t], j ∈ [n]
• ain,j : bn,j > bn−1,j > bn,j ∀i ∈ [t], j ∈ [n]
• aiq,j : bq−1,j > bq,j > bq+1,j > bq,j ∀i ∈ [t], q ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1},j ∈ [n]
• aiq,j : bq−1,j > bq,j > bq+1,j > bq,j ∀i ∈ [t], q ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1},j ∈ [n]
• ai1,j : b1,j > b2,j > b1,j ∀i ∈ [t], j ∈ [n]
• ai1,j : b1,j > b2,j > b1,j ∀i ∈ [t], j ∈ [n]
Layer 2dlog te+ 2 is a composition of the profiles P3(Di) over Ai(n, n) and
I(n, n) for each i ∈ [t].
• aij,indDi (j,3) : bDi(j, 3) > bDi(j, 2) > bDi(j, 3) ∀i ∈ [t], j ∈ [n]
• aij,indDi (j,2) : bDi(j, 2) > bDi(j, 1) > bDi(j, 2) ∀i ∈ [t], j ∈ [n]
• aij,indDi (j,1) : bDi(j, 1) > bDi(j, 3) > bDi(j, 1) ∀i ∈ [t], j ∈ [n]
• aij,indDi (j,r) : bDi(j, r) > bDi(j, r) ∀i ∈ [t], j ∈ [n], r ∈ [3]
• aiq,r : bq,r > bq,r ∀i ∈ [t], q, r ∈ [n] such that xr does not appear in
the q-th clause in Ci
• aiq,r : bq,r > bq,r ∀i ∈ [t], q, r ∈ [n] such that xr does not appear in
the q-th clause in Ci
We finally set α = dlog te+ 2. We claim the following:
Claim 4.12. Let p : A → I ∪ {b∅} be an assignment for the constructed
instance and let i ∈ dlog te. Then p satisfies the following:
• p is pareto optimal in layer i if and only if it allocates all the items in I to
agents from the set {arq,j , arq,j | q, j ∈ [n], r ∈ [t] such that r[i] = 0}.
• p is pareto optimal in layer dlog te+i if and only if it allocates all the items
in I to agents from the set {arq,j , arq,j | q, j ∈ [n], r ∈ [t] such that r[i] = 1}.
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Proof. We provide a proof for the first condition (the proof for the second is
symmetric).
(⇒): Assume that p is pareto optimal in layer i. Since the preference lists
of agents arq,j and arq,j for all q, j ∈ [n] and r ∈ [t] such that r[i] = 1 are
empty, p allocates b∅ to all such agents, and therefore allocates items only
to agents from {arq,j , arq,j | q, j ∈ [n], r ∈ [t] such that r[i] = 0}. In addition,
observe that each item in I is acceptable by at least two agents from the set
{arq,j , arq,j | q, j ∈ [n], r ∈ [t] such that r[i] = 0}. By Proposition 2.3, p does
not admit self loops. Thus we have that all the items in I are allocated.
(⇐): Suppose that p allocates all the items in I to agents from the set
{arq,j , arq,j | q, j ∈ [n], r ∈ [t] such that r[i] = 0}. First, since p allocates all
the items, it does not admit self loops in layer i. Second, observe that all the
agents pairwise respect each other in this layer, thus by Lemma 3.5, p does
not admit trading cycle. By Proposition 2.3, p is pareto optimal in layer i. ♦
Claim 4.13. Let p : A → I ∪ {b∅} be an assignment for the constructed
instance. Then there does not exist i ∈ dlog te such that p is pareto optimal in
both layers i and dlog te+ i.
Proof. Towards a contradiction, suppose there exists i ∈ dlog te such that p is
pareto optimal in both layers i and dlog te+i. By Claim 4.12, p allocates all the
items in I to agents from both {arq,j , arq,j | q, j ∈ [n], r ∈ [t] such that r[i] = 0}
and {arq,j , arq,j | q, j ∈ [n], r ∈ [t] such that r[i] = 1}, but the intersection of
these two sets is empty, a contradiction. ♦
Claim 4.14. Let p : A → I ∪ {b∅} be an assignment for the constructed
instance. Then p is pareto optimal in at most dlog te layers among the first
2dlog te layers.
Proof. Claim 4.13 implies that for each i ∈ dlog te, p is pareto optimal in at
most one among layers i and dlog te+ i. Implying that p is pareto optimal in
at most dlog te layers among the first 2dlog te layers. ♦
Let i ∈ [t], and let p be an assignment for the constructed instance. We
say that p encodes i in the first 2dlog te layers if it satisfies the following:
• For each j ∈ [dlog te] such that i[j] = 0, p is pareto optimal in layer j.
• For each j ∈ [dlog te] such that i[j] = 1, p is pareto optimal in layer
dlog te+ j.
Claim 4.15. Let p : A → I ∪ {b∅} be an α-globally optimal assignment for
the constructed instance. Then there exists i ∈ [t] that p encodes in the first
2dlog te layers.
Proof. Since α = dlog te + 2, Claim 4.14 implies that p is pareto optimal in
exactly dlog te layers among the first 2dlog te layers. By Claim 4.13, for each
j ∈ [dlog te], p is pareto optimal in either layer j or layer dlog te + j. Denote
i[j] = 0 if p is pareto optimal in layer j and i[j] = 1 if p is pareto optimal
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in layer dlog te+ j. Observe that p encodes i = i[1]i[2] . . . i[dlog te] in the first
2dlog te layers. ♦
Claim 4.16. Let p : A → I ∪ {b∅} be an assignment for the constructed
instance. Then there exists i ∈ [t] such that p encodes i in the first 2dlog te
layers if and only if p is pareto optimal in P1(n, n) over the agent set Ai(n, n)
and the item set I(n, n).
Proof. (⇒): Assume that there exists i ∈ [t] that p encodes in the first
2dlog te layers. Observe that for each j ∈ [dlog te], if i[j] = 0 then p is
pareto optimal in layer j, and if i[j] = 1 then p is pareto optimal in layer
dlog te + j. By Claim 4.12, p allocates all the items in I to agents from⋂dlog te
j=1 {arq,s, arq,s | q, s ∈ [n], r ∈ [t] such that r[j] = i[j]} = Ai(n, n). Since the
agents in Ai(n, n) respect each other in P1(n, n) over Ai(n, n) and I(n, n), and
all the items are allocated to Ai(n, n), we have by Lemma 3.5 and Proposi-
tion 2.3 that p is pareto optimal in P1(n, n) over Ai(n, n) and I(n, n).
(⇐): Suppose that p is pareto optimal in P1(n, n) over Ai(n, n) and I(n, n).
We claim that p encodes i in the first 2dlog te layers: By Claim 4.12, for each
j ∈ [dlog te], if i[j] = 0 then p is pareto optimal in layer j, and if i[j] = 1 then
p is pareo optimal in layer dlog te + j. Then we have that p encodes i in the
first 2dlog te layers. ♦
Claim 4.17. Let p : A → I ∪ {b∅} be an assignment such that there exists
i ∈ [t] such that p encodes i in the first 2dlog te layers. Then p is pareto optimal
in layer 2dlog te+1 if and only if it is pareto optimal in P2(n, n) over Ai(n, n)
and I(n, n).
Proof. (⇒): Assume that p is pareto optimal in layer 2dlog te+1. Since P2(n, n)
over Ai(n, n) and I(n, n) is contained in the preference profile of layer 2dlog te+
1, p must be pareto optimal in this sub-profile.
(⇐): Assume that p is pareto optimal in P3(n, n) over Ai(n, n) and I(n, n).
By the construction of P3(n, n) over Ai(n, n) and I(n, n), p must allocate all
the items to agents from Ai(n, n), as otherwise, it would admit self loops.
Observe that agents from A\Ai(n, n) do not admit trading cycles since they are
assigned to b∅, and they also do not admit self loops since all their acceptable
items are already allocated by p. ♦
Claim 4.18. Let p : A → I ∪ {b∅} be an assignment such that there exists
i ∈ [t] such that p encodes i in the first 2dlog te layers. Then p is pareto optimal
in layer 2dlog te+ 2 if and only if it is pareto optimal in P3(Di) over Ai(n, n)
and I(n, n).
Proof. (⇒): Assume that p is pareto optimal in layer 2dlog te+2. Since P3(n, n)
over Ai(n, n) and I(n, n) is contained in the preference profile of layer 2dlog te+
1, p must be pareto optimal in this sub-profile.
(⇐): Assume that p is pareto optimal in P3(n, n) over Ai(n, n) and I(n, n).
By the construction of P3(n, n) over Ai(n, n) and I(n, n), p must allocate all
the items to agents from Ai(n, n), as otherwise, it would admit self loops.
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Fig. 9 If p is (dlog te + 2)-globally optimal for the constructed instance, then the dlog te
layers in which it is pareto optimal among the first 2dlog te layers encode i ∈ [t] such that:
(1) p allocates all the items from I(n, n) to all the agents from Ai(n, n), and (2) p is pareto
optimal in P1(n, n) over Ai(n, n) and I(n, n). We have that p must be pareto optimal in
both layers 2dlog te+ 1 and 2dlog te+ 2, implying that it is pareto optimal in both P2(n, n)
and P3(Di) over Ai(n, n) and I(n, n).
Observe that agents in A \ Ai(n, n) do not admit trading cycles since they
are assigned to b∅, they also do not admit self loops since all their acceptable
items are already allocated by p. ♦
We now prove the correctness of the construction. Namely, there exists
i ∈ [t] such that Di is a Yes-instance of 3-SAT if and only if there exists an
α-globally optimal for the constructed instance.
(⇒): Suppose there exists i ∈ [t] such that Di is a Yes-instance. By
Lemma 3.11, there exists an assignment q : A(n, n) → I(n, n) ∪ {b∅} such
that q is pareto optimal in P1(n, n), P2(n, n) and P3(Di). We define an assign-
ment p : A→ I ∪ {b∅} by p(air,j) = q(ar,j), p(air,j) = q(ar,j) for each j, r ∈ [n],
and p(ayr,j) = b∅, p(a
y
r,j) = b∅ for each j, r ∈ [n], y ∈ [t] \ {i}. By Claims 4.12
and 4.14, we have that p is pareto optimal in exactly dlog te layers among the
first 2dlog te layers and that it encodes i. By Claims 4.17 and 4.18, p is pareto
optimal in both layers 2dlog te + 1 and 2dlog te + 2. Thus, p is an α-globally
optimal assignment for the constructed instance.
(⇐): Assume that there exists p : A→ I ∪ {b∅} that is α-globally optimal
for the constructed instance (see Figure 9). By Claims 4.14 and 4.15, p is pareto
optimal in exactly dlog te layers among the first 2dlog te layers, and there exists
i ∈ [t] such that p encodes i in the first 2dlog te layers. By Claim 4.16, p is
pareto optimal in P1(n, n) over Ai(n, n) and I(n, n). Since p is α-globally
optimal, it is pareto optimal in layers 2dlog te + 1 and 2dlog te + 2. Claims
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4.17 and 4.18 imply that p is pareto optimal in both P2(n, n) and P3(Di) over
Ai(n, n) and I(n, n). Hence, by Lemma 3.11, we have that Di is a Yes-instance.
Since the constructed instance satisfies #items + ` = O(n2 + log(t)), we
have by Proposition 2.10 that Globally Optimal Assignment does not
admit a polynomial kernel with respect to the parameter k = #items + `,
unless NP⊆coNP/poly.
5 Fixed-Parameter Tractability and ETH Based Lower Bounds
We prove that Globally Optimal Assignment is FPT with respect to the
parameter k = #agents by presenting an algorithm with running time O∗(k!).
Furthermore, we prove that this is essentially the best possible running time
for this parameter (and even for a larger parameter) under ETH.
Let us first prove the following lemma.
Lemma 5.1. Let (A, I, P1, . . . , P`, α) be an instance of Globally Optimal
Assignment, and let p be an assignment. Let Gi denote the trading graph
of Pi with respect to p for each i ∈ [`]. Then p is α-globally optimal for the
instance if and only if there exists α trading graphs among G1 . . . , G` that
contain no cycles.
Proof. (⇒) Assume that p is α-globally optimal. Then there exist α layers
i1, . . . , iα such that for each j ∈ [α], p is pareto optimal in Pij . By Proposi-
tion 2.4, for each j ∈ [α], Gij does not contain cycles.
(⇐) Assume that there exist α layers i1, . . . , iα, such that for each j ∈ [α],
Gij does not contain cycles. By Proposition 2.4, p is pareto optimal in each
Pij , implying that it is α-globally optimal.
Theorem 7. There exists an O∗(n!) algorithm for Globally Optimal As-
signment, where n = #agents.
Proof. We present a brute-force algorithm (described formally in Algorithm
2). The algorithm enumerates all possible pareto optimal assignments for each
layer, using serial dictatorship. For each assignment, it constructs the corre-
sponding trading graphs, and checks whether there exist α graphs with no
cycles.
The running time of the algorithm is O∗(n!), since it iterates over `(n!)
assignments, and for each assignment, it takes polynomial time to construct
`− 1 trading graphs, and to count how many of them contain no cycles.
Let us now prove that the algorithm returns “yes” if and only if the input
is a Yes-instance.
(⇒) Suppose that the algorithm returns “yes”. This implies that there exist
a layer i ∈ [`] and a permutation pi on A, such that serial dictatorship on Pi
with respect to pi produces an assignment p satisfying that there exist α − 1
graphs among the trading graphs of {Pj | j ∈ [`], j 6= i} with respect to p
which do not contain cycles. By Proposition 2.5, p is pareto optimal in Pi,
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input : An instance (A, I, P1, . . . , P`, α)
output: Does an α-globally optimal assignment exist?
foreach i ∈ [`] do
foreach permutation pi on A do
apply serial dictatorship on profile Pi with respect to pi, to
obtain an assignment p
count←− 1
foreach j ∈ [`] \ {i} do
G←− Pj ’s trading graph with respect to p
if G contains no cycles then
count←− count+ 1
end
end
if count ≥ α then
return “yes”
end
end
end
return “no”
Algorithm 2: Algorithm for Globally Optimal Assignment.
and by Lemma 5.1, it is pareto optimal in α − 1 preference profiles among
{Pj | j ∈ [`], j 6= i}. This implies that p is α-globally optimal.
(⇐) Suppose we are dealing with a Yes-instance; then, there exists an as-
signment p, and α layers i1, . . . , iα in which p is pareto optimal. Proposition 2.5
implies that for each of these layers ij , there exists a permutation pij such that
applying serial dictatorship on Pij with respect to pij results in p. Thus, when
the algorithm reaches one of the layers i1, . . . , iα and its corresponding permu-
tation for the first time, it generates p. By Lemma 5.1, the algorithm verifies
correctly that it is α-globally optimal.
By Theorems 4 and 7, we conclude the following.
Corollary 5.2. Globally Optimal Assignment is solvable in time
O∗(((m!)`+1)!) where m = #items.
We now prove that O∗(k!) is a tight lower bound on the running time
under ETH, even when k = #agents + #items + α, making the algorithm in
Theorem 7 optimal. To prove this, we will need the following.
Proposition 5.3 (Cygan et al. [11]). Suppose that there is a polynomial-
time parameterized reduction from problem A to problem B such that if the
parameter of an instance of A is k, then the parameter of the constructed
instance of B is at most g(k) for some nondecreasing function g. Then an
O∗(2o(f(k)))-time algorithm for B for some nondecreasing function f implies
an O∗(2o(f(g(k))))-time algorithm for A.
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Fig. 10 For the presented graph, the constructed instance of Globally Optimal Assign-
ment consists of 9 layers, one for each row-column pair; {(1, 1), (2, 3), (3, 2)} is a 3 × 3-
permutation clique. Thus, the assignment p which satisfies p(a1) = b1, p(a2) = b3, and
p(a3) = b2 is 3-globally optimal for the constructed instance, and is pareto optimal in the
profiles P(1,1), P(2,3), and P(3,2).
Theorem 8. Unless ETH fails, there does not exist an algorithm for Glob-
ally Optimal Assignment with running time O∗(2o(k log k)) where k =
#agents + #items + α.
Proof. We provide a linear parameter reduction from k × k Permutation
Clique. In the k × k Permutation Clique problem, we are given a graph
G where the vertices are elements of a k × k table, namely, V (G) = [k]× [k].
Then, a k × k-permutation clique is a clique of size k in G that contains
exactly one vertex from each row and exactly one vertex from each column. In
other words, there exists a permutation pi on [k] such that the vertices of the
clique are (1, pi(1)), . . . , (k, pi(k)). The task is to decide whether there exists a
k × k-permutation clique in G. Lokshtanov et al. [19] proved that there is no
O∗(2o(k log k))-time algorithm for k × k Permutation Clique, unless ETH
fails.
Let (G, k) be an instance of k × k Permutation Clique. We create an
agent ai for each row i ∈ [k], and an item bj for each column j ∈ [k]. We
construct an instance of Globally Optimal Assignment consisting of k2
layers, each corresponds to a row-column pair (i, j), containing the preference
profile P(i,j) defined as follows.
• ai : bj
• ar : {bq | {(i, j), (r, q)} ∈ E(G), q 6= j} (sorted in ascending order by
q) ∀r ∈ [k] \ {i}.
We finally set α = k. We prove now that there exists a k × k-permutation
clique in G if and only if there exists a k-globally optimal assignment for the
constructed instance.
(⇒) Suppose there exists a permutation pi for [k] such that
(1, pi(1)), . . . , (k, pi(k)) form a clique in G. We define an assignment p by
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p(ai) = bpi(i) for each i ∈ [k], and we claim that p is pareto optimal in each
P(i,pi(i)) (see Figure 10). Observe that for each i ∈ [k], bpi(i) is acceptable by
ai in P(i,pi(i)) and in all profiles P(j,pi(j)) such that j ∈ [k] \ {i} since there is
an edge between (i, pi(i)) and each (j, pi(j)). Moreover, each P(j,pi(j)) contains
no self loops due to the fact that all the items are allocated. Since we sorted
each preference list in an ascending order by the item indices, all the agents
respect each other in each preference profile and by Lemma 3.5, p does not
admit trading cycles in any layer.
(⇐) Suppose there exists a k-globally optimal assignment p for the con-
structed instance. Note that if p is pareto optimal in some profile P(i,j), it
must satisfy p(ai) = bj , as otherwise, ai would admit a self loop (bj is not ac-
ceptable by any agent but ai in P(i,j)). Hence, we have that for each i ∈ [k], p
is pareto optimal in at most one profile among P(i,1), . . . , P(i,k) and in at most
one profile among P(1,i), . . . , P(k,i). Since we set α = k, we have that for each
i ∈ [k], p is pareto optimal in exactly one profile among P(i,1), . . . , P(i,k) and
in exactly one profile among P(1,i), . . . , P(k,i). This implies that there exists a
permutation pi on [k] such that p is pareto optimal in P(i,pi(i)) for each i ∈ [k].
We claim that {(i, pi(i)) | i ∈ [k]} is the vertex set of a clique in G. Towards a
contradiction, suppose that there exist two different rows i1 and i2 such that
{(i1, pi(i1)), (i2, pi(i2))} /∈ E(G). By the construction of the preference lists,
observe that bpi(i2) is not acceptable by ai2 in P(i1,pi(i1)). Therefore, p is not a
legal assignment for P(i1,pi(i1)), a contradiction to its optimality.
It holds that #agents + #items + α = O(k). Thus, by Proposition 5.3, we
conclude that there is no O∗(2o(k log k))-time algorithm for Globally Opti-
mal Assignment, unless ETH fails.
We now prove a that the same result holds also for the parameter #agents+
#items + (`− α).
Theorem 9. Unless ETH fails, there does not exists an algorithm for Glob-
ally Optimal Assignment with running time O∗(2o(k log k)), where k =
#agents + #items + (`− α).
Proof. We provide a different linear parameter reduction from k×k Permuta-
tion Clique for the parameter #agents+#items+(`−α). Let (G = (V,E), k)
be an instance of k× k Permutation Clique (recall that V = [k]× [k]). We
create 2k agents a1, . . . , ak, c1, . . . , ck, and 2k items b1, . . . , bk, d1, . . . , dk. Then,
we construct an instance of Globally Optimal Assignment consisting of
` = 1 + k +
(
k2
2
)− |E| layers as follows. Intuitively, the first layer requires the
agents a1, . . . , ak to accept only the items b1, . . . , bk, and the agents c1, . . . , ck
to accept only the items d1, . . . , dk. Formally, it is defined as follows:
• ai : b1 > . . . > bk ∀i ∈ [k]
• ci : d1 > . . . > dk ∀i ∈ [k]
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The next k layers require ai and ci to “agree” with each other. Namely,
p(ai) = bj if and only if p(ci) = dj . To this end, for each j ∈ [k], we construct
the following preference profile:
• ai : {bq | q ∈ [k]} \ {bj} (sorted in ascending order by q) > {dq | q ∈
[k]} > bj ∀i ∈ [k]
• ci : dj > bj > {dq | q ∈ [k]} \ {dj} (sorted in ascending order by q)
∀i ∈ [k]
We construct additional
(
k2
2
) − |E| layers (notice that there are exactly(
k2
2
) − |E| pairs of vertices {(i1, j1), (i2, j2)} that are not adjacent in G).
Each layer is defined with respect to a vertex pair (i1, j1) 6= (i2, j2) such
that {(i1, j1), (i2, j2)} /∈ E as follows:
• ai1 : {bq | q ∈ [k]} \ {bj1} (sorted in ascending order by q) > dj2 > bj1
• ci2 : {dq | q ∈ [k]} \ {dj2} (sorted in ascending order by q) > bj1 > dj2
• ai : {bq | q ∈ [k]} \ {bj1} (sorted in ascending order by q) > bj1 ∀i ∈
[k] \ {i1}
• ci : {dq | q ∈ [k]} \ {dj2} (sorted in ascending order by q) > dj2 ∀i ∈
[k] \ {i2}
Finally, we set α = `. The reduction can be done in a polynomial time using
simple polynomial-time operations on graphs. Before we prove the correctness
of the construction, let us prove the following:
Claim 5.4. Let p be an `-globally optimal assignment for the constructed
instance. Then, for each i ∈ [k], p(ai) ∈ {b1 . . . bk}, and p(ci) ∈ {d1, . . . , dk}.
Proof. Observe that in the first layer, b1, . . . , bk are all only acceptable by
a1, . . . , ak and d1, . . . , dk are all only acceptable by c1, . . . , ck. Hence, p must
allocate all the items. Towards a contradiction, suppose that there exists bj
that is not assigned to any agent (the case when there exists dj that is not
assigned to any agent is symmetric). This implies that there exists an agent ai
that satisfies p(ai) = b∅ and therefore admits a self loop with bj , a contradiction
to the optimality of p in the first layer. ♦
Claim 5.5. Let p be an `-globally optimal assignment for the constructed
instance. Then, for every i, j ∈ [k], p(ai) = bj if and only if p(ci) = dj.
Proof. Towards a contradiction, suppose there exist i, j ∈ [k] such that
p(ai) = bj and p(ci) 6= dj (the second case where p(ci) = dj and p(ai) 6= bj is
symmetric). By Claim 5.4, p(ci) = dq such that q 6= j. Note that p admits the
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trading cycle (ai, bj , ci, dq) in layer j, a contradiction to the `-global optimality
of p. ♦
Claim 5.6. Let p be an `-globally optimal assignment for the constructed
instance. Let pi : [k]→ [k] be defined as follows: pi(i) = j such that p(ai) = bj
for each i ∈ [k]. Let V ′ = {(i, pi(i)) | i ∈ [k]}. Then V ′ is the vertex set of a
k × k-permutation clique in G.
Proof. Observe that pi is a well-defined permutation on [k] since p allocates all
the items in {b1, . . . , bk}. Towards a contradiction, suppose there exist different
i1, i2 ∈ [k] such that {(i1, pi(i1)), (i2, pi(i2))} /∈ E. First, by Claims 5.4 and 5.5,
p(ci1) = dpi(i1) and p(ci2) = dpi(i2). Second, by the construction of the instance,
there exists a layer among the
(
k2
2
)− |E| last layers which corresponds to the
non-adjacent pair {(i1, pi(i1)), (i2, pi(i2)}. Note that p admits the trading cycle
(ai1 , bpi(i1), ci2 , dpi(i2)) in this layer, a contradiction. ♦
We now prove that there exists a k×k-permutation clique in G if and only
if there exists an `-globally optimal assignment for the constructed instance.
(⇒): Let pi be a permutation on [k] such that V ′ = {(1, pi(1)), . . . , (k, pi(k))}
is the vertex set of a k×k-permutation clique in G. Let us define an assignment
p by p(ai) = bpi(i), and p(ci) = dpi(i) for each i ∈ [k]. Observe that both
{a1, . . . , ak} and {c1, . . . , ck} contain agents that pairwise respect each other.
Since each dj is not acceptable by any ai, and each bj is not acceptable by any
ci, we have by Lemma 3.5 that p does not admit trading cycles in the first layer.
Moreover, since all the items are allocated, it does not admit self loops in the
first layer, implying that p is pareto optimal in the this layer. Furthermore,
p is also pareto optimal in the next k layers since ai and ci “agree” with
each other for each i ∈ [k]. Formally, for every j ∈ [k], both {a1, . . . , ak} and
{c1, . . . , ck} contain agents that pairwise respect each other in layer 1 + j. By
the construction of layer 1 + j, and by Lemma 3.5, the only possible trading
cycle in this layer occurs when p(ai) = bj , and p(ci) = dq such that q 6= j.
We claim that p is also pareto optimal in the last
(
k2
2
)− |E| layers. Suppose,
for the sake of contradiction, that there exists a pair {(q1, r1), (q2, r2)} /∈ E,
such that p is not pareto optimal in its corresponding layer. By Lemma 3.5,
the only possible trading cycle in this layer is (aq1 , br1 , cq2 , dr2). Thus, we have
that p(aq1) = br1 and p(cq2) = dr2 . By the construction of p, both (q1, r1) and
(q2, r2) are vertices in V ′, a contradiction.
(⇐): Let p be an `-globally optimal assignment for the constructed in-
stance. By Claim 5.6, there exists a k × k-permutation clique in G.
Theorem 10. Globally Optimal Assignment is solvable in time
(nm)O(m) where n = #agents and m = #items.
Proof. We present a simple brute-force algorithm. The algorithm simply it-
erates over all subsets of items I ′ ⊆ I. For each subset, it iterates over all
subsets A′ ⊆ A such that |A′| = |I ′|. For each a /∈ A′, the algorithm allocates
b∅, and it tries all possible |I ′|! different ways to allocate the items in I ′ to the
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agents in A′ (it skips allocations that allocate items that are not acceptable by
their owner in more than `−α+1 layers). The algorithm constructs the corre-
sponding trading graphs, and verifies in polynomial time whether the current
assignment is α-globally optimal. Hence, the running time of the algorithm is∑m
t=0
(
m
t
) ·(nt) · t! · (n+m)O(1) ≤ m ·2m ·nm2 ·m! · (n+m)O(1) = (nm)O(m).
Theorem 11. Globally Optimal Assignment is W[1]-hard for the pa-
rameter k = #items + α.
Proof. We provide a parameterized (and also polynomial time) reduction from
the W[1]-hard problem Multicolored Independent Set to Globally
Optimal Assignment. The input of Multicolored Independent Set
consists of an undirected graph G = (V,E), and a coloring c : V → [k]
that colors the vertices in V with k colors. The task is to decide whether G
admits a multicolored independent set of size k, which is an independent set
(i.e. a vertex subset with pair-wise non-adjacent vertices) V ′ ⊆ V that satisfies
{c(v′) | v′ ∈ V ′} = [k] and |V ′| = k.
Given an instance (G = (V,E), c) of Multicolored Independent Set,
denote V = {v1, . . . , vn}. We construct an instance of Globally Optimal
Assignment consisting of n layers, with agent set A = {a1, . . . , an}, and item
set I = {b1, . . . , bk}. Intuitively, each agent ai corresponds to the vertex vi,
and each item bi corresponds to the color i ∈ [k]. We construct the instance
such that the items are allocated to agents whose corresponding vertices form
a multicolored independent set. For each i ∈ [n], we construct the preference
profile in layer i, denoted by Pi, as follows:
• ai : bc(vi)
• aj : ∅ ∀j ∈ [n] \ {i} and c(vj) = c(vi)
• aj : ∅ ∀j ∈ [n] \ {i} such that {vi, vj} ∈ E and c(vj) 6= c(vi)
• aj : bc(vj) ∀j ∈ [n] \ {i} such that {vi, vj} /∈ E and c(vj) 6= c(vi)
Finally, we set α = k. The construction clearly can be done in a polyno-
mial time. Before we prove the correctness of the reduction, let us prove the
following claim.
Claim 5.7. Let p : A→ I ∪ {b∅} be an assignment. Then for any i ∈ [n], if p
is pareto optimal in layer i, then it satisfies that p(ai) = bc(vi), and for each
j ∈ [n] \ {i} such that {vi, vj} ∈ E, p(aj) = b∅.
Proof. Let i ∈ [n]. Assume that p is pareto optimal in layer i. Note that ai is
the only agent that accepts bc(vi) in Pi and this is the only item it accepts.
Hence, p must allocate bi to ai, as otherwise, ai would be a part of a self loop.
Moreover, for each j ∈ [n] such that {vi, vj} ∈ E, the preference list of aj in
Pi is empty, implying that p(aj) = b∅. ♦
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Fig. 11 In the presented graph colored using 5 colors, {v1, v3, v4, v5, v6} is a multicolored
independent set of size 5. The contsructed instance contains 8 layers, one for each vertex; and
the presented assignment is 5-globally optimal since it is pareto optimal in layers 1, 3, 4, 5,
and 6.
We now prove that G admits a multicolored independent set of size k if
and only if the constructed instance admits a k-globally optimal assignment.
(⇒) Assume that G admits a multicolored independent set V ′ =
{vi1 , . . . , vik}. We define an assignment p by p(aij ) = bc(vj) for each j ∈ [k] (see
Figure 11), and p(ai) = b∅ for each i /∈ {i1, . . . , ik}. Note that the assignment
does not assign the same item to two or more agents since the colors of the
vertices in V ′ are distinct. We claim that p is k-globally optimal for the con-
structed instance. First, the agents ai1 , . . . , aik contain non-empty preference
lists in the preference profiles Pi1 , . . . , Pik since their corresponding vertices
are pair-wise non-adjacent and colored with distinct colors. Hence, each item
is acceptable by its owner in each Pij . Second, Pi1 , . . . , Pik cannot include
trading cycles since each preference list is of length at most one.
(⇐) Suppose there exists a k-globally optimal assignment p for the con-
structed instance. Then, there exist k layers i1, . . . , ik such that p is pareto opti-
mal in each Pij . Proposition 5.7 implies that for each j ∈ [k], p(aij ) = bc(vij ),
and for each q ∈ [n] such that {vq, vj} ∈ E, p(aq) = b∅. We claim that
V ′ = {vi1 , . . . , vik} is a multicolored independent set. First, we show that
it forms an independent set. Towards a contradiction, suppose there exist
j1, j2 ∈ [k] such that {vij1 , vij2 } ∈ E. Then, the preference list of aij2 in Pij1 is
empty, and therefore p is not legal in Pij1 , a contradiction to its pareto optimal-
ity in Pij1 . Second, we show that it is multicolored. Towards a contradiction,
suppose there exist j1, j2 ∈ [k] such that c(vij1 ) = c(vij2 ). By Claim 5.7,
since p is pareto optimal in layers ij1 and ij2 , it satisfies p(aij1 ) = bc(vij1 ) and
p(aij2 ) = bc(vij1 ). We have that p assigns bc(vij1 ) to two agents, a contradic-
tion.
We now provide a similar hardness result for the parameter #items+(`−α).
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Theorem 12. Globally Optimal Assignment is W[1]-hard for the pa-
rameter k = #items + (`− α).
Proof. We provide a different parameterized (and polynomial time) reduction
from Multicolored Independent Set to Globally Optimal Assign-
ment.
Given an instance (G = (V,E), c) of Multicolored Independent
Set, assume that V = {v1, . . . , vn}. We construct an instance of Glob-
ally Optimal Assignment with agent set A = {a1, . . . , an} and item set
I = {b1, . . . , bk}, consisting of ` = n+1 layers. Informally speaking, each agent
ai corresponds to a vertex vi, and each item bi corresponds to a color i. We
construct an instance such that the agents that allocate items from I in an `-
globally optimal assignment correspond to vertices which form a multicolored
independent set in G. Moreover, we require each agent to allocate either the
item that corresponds to its color with respect to c, or b∅. The first layer is
defined as follows:
• ai : bc(i) ∀i ∈ [k]
We construct n additional layers. For each i ∈ [n], layer 1 + i is defined as
follows:
• ai : {bj | j ∈ [k]} \ {bc(vi)} (ordered arbitrarily) > bc(vi)
• aj : bc(vj) ∀j ∈ [n] \ {i} such that (1) {vi, vj} ∈ E and c(vj) = c(vi)
or (2) {vi, vj} /∈ E
• aj : bc(vi) > bc(vj) ∀j ∈ [n]\{i} such that {vi, vj} ∈ E and c(vj) 6= c(vi)
We finally set α = `. We claim that G admits a multicolored independent
set of size k if and only if there exists an `-globally optimal assignment for the
constructed instance.
(⇒): Suppose G admits a multicolored independent set of size k, V ′ =
{vi1 , . . . , vik}. We define an assignment p by p(aij ) = bc(vij ) for each j ∈ [k],
and p(ai) = b∅ for each i /∈ {i1, . . . , ik}. We claim that p is pareto optimal in all
the layers. First, observe that for each i ∈ [k], p(ai) is acceptable by ai in each
layer, and each layer cannot admit self loops since all the items are allocated.
Second, p is pareto optimal in the first layer: since each agent accepts only a
single item, no subset of agents can admit a trading cycle. Third, we claim
that p is pareto-optimal in layer 1+ i for each i ∈ [n]. Towards a contradiction,
suppose that there exists i ∈ [n] such that p is not pareto optimal in layer 1+i.
By Proposition 2.3 there exists a trading cycle in layer 1 + i. Observe that a
trading cycle in layer 1 + i cannot contain agents with a single item on their
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preference list. Moreover, it cannot contain only agents from {aj | {vi, vj} ∈
E and c(vj) 6= c(vi)} since each such agent ranks bc(vi) first in its preference
list. Therefore, we have that the only possible trading cycle in layer 1 + i
consists of the agent ai and an agent ar such that p(ai) = bc(vi), c(vi) 6= c(vr),
{vi, vr} ∈ E, and p(ar) = bc(vr). Then, by the construction of p, we have that
vi, vr ∈ V ′, a contradiction.
(⇐): Suppose there exists an α-globally optimal assignment p for the con-
structed instance. We first show that p must allocate all the items. Towards
a contradiction, assume that there exists j ∈ [k] such that bj is not assigned
to any agent. Since n ≥ k, there exists an agent at that is not assigned to an
item. Notice that at accepts all the items in layer 1+ t, thus, at and bj admit a
self loop, a contradiction. Let ai1 , . . . , aik denote the agents that are allocated
an item from I. We claim that p(aij ) = bc(vij ) for each j ∈ [k]. For the sake of
contradiction, assume that there exists j ∈ [k] such that p(aij ) 6= bc(vij ). We
consider two cases: (1) p(aij ) = b∅. In this case, p admits a self loop among
aij and bc(vij ) in the first layer, a contradiction. (2) p(aij ) = br 6= bc(vij ). In
this case, p is not legal in the first layer, a contradiction. This implies that
the vertices in the set V ′ = {vi1 , . . . , vik} are colored with all the colors. We
claim that V ′ is a also an independent set. Towards a contradiction, assume
there exist j, r ∈ [k] such that {vij , vir} ∈ E. Then we have that aij and air
form the trading cycle (aij , bc(vij ), air , bc(vir )) in layer 1 + ir, a contradiction
to Proposition 2.3.
6 Conclusion and Future Research
In this paper, we considered a new generalization of the Assignment problem
where each agent is equipped with multiple incomplete preference lists and we
defined a new natural concept of optimality. We considered several natural
parameters and we presented a comprehensive picture of the parameterized
complexity of the problem with respect to them.
Our results show that the problem of finding an α-globally optimal as-
signment is, in general, computationally hard, and that it gives better results
when the parameter depends on #agents (and α or `) than when it depends
on #items (and α or `). We proved that the problem is unlikely to have an
XP algorithm with respect to the parameter α+ `+ d. We provided an O∗(k!)
algorithm for the parameter k = #agents and a double-exponential kernel for
the parameter k = #items + `. Both results show that the problem is FPT
with respect to these parameters. We also proved that O∗(k!) is essentially a
tight lower bound on the running time under ETH for even larger parameters
than #agents such as #agents + #items +α and #agents + #items + (`−α).
Moreover, we proved that the problem admits a polynomial kernel with respect
to the parameter #agents + ` but is unlikely to admit one with respect to all
the other parameters that we considered. Lastly, we proved that the problem
is W[1]-hard with respect to the parameters #items +α and #items + (`−α).
However, two question are still open:
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1. Is it possible to obtain a (not polynomial) kernel for the parameter k =
#items + ` with size substantially smaller than O∗((m!)`+1)?
2. Is it possible to obtain an algorithm with a better running time than O∗(k!)
for the parameter k = #agents + #items + `? It can be shown using a
similar reduction from 3-SAT that the problem cannot be solved in time
2o(k) under ETH. Maybe a 2O(k)-algorithm can be achieved.
Continuing our research, it might be interesting to study the problem with
“weaker” definitions of optimality, for example:
1. Finding an assignment such that for every group of k agents there exist α
layers where they do not appear together in a trading cycle.
2. Finding an assignment such that there exists α layers, in which the maximal
length of a trading cycle is at most c, for a given c ∈ N.
For the first suggestion, A “verification” variant can also be suggested,
i.e. given assignment p, check whether every group of k agents do not appear
together in a trading cycle in at least α layers.
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